America’s Entry into the First World War & the Balfour Declaration

This is actually the first section of Part Three of “Wired for Terror: On the Trail of the Men Who Brought Down the Towers,” but while I am putting the rest of it together over the holidays, I thought that I would post the very beginning of Part Three now as it concerns the Balfour Declaration, and seemed to be such a lively topic of conversation here just a few weeks back. Happy Holidays. Peace to you and yours.

With the publishing of Der Judenstaat (“The Jewish State”) in 1896 and the founding of the World Zionist Organization (WZO) in Basel, Switzerland the following year by Theodor Herzl and his colleagues, plans to somehow acquire Palestine in order to establish a Jewish State began developing. With the land of Palestine under the control of the Islamic Ottoman Empire, however, there was little hope of convincing Sultan ‘Abd al-Hamid II to just give away a piece of the Empire to a small organization of European Jews operating under the impression that an ancient Canaanite deity named Yahweh(1) had given Palestine to their tribal ancestors as an eternal real estate holding. With the outbreak of the First World War on July 28, 1914, however, the opportunity to make a deal for Palestine with the allied powers of the Triple Entente (Britain, France, and Russia) would soon avail itself to the new Zionist movement.

During the first half of the First World War, the policymakers within the British war cabinet in London gave no credence to Palestine as a place of strategic value in the Middle East. By the summer of 1916, however, the Triple Entente was beginning to sense their own vulnerabilities and began looking upon defeat as a possible outcome of their endeavors. On the western front, the Allied losses were three men for every two losses for the Germans, and Allied shipping was taking a serious beating because of constant German submarine attacks. If the Allies were to win the war, they would need to bring in the Americans. At this time, a politically well-connected, Oxford-educated Armenian named James Malcolm approached his good friend in the British Foreign Office, Sir Mark Sykes, with an idea. Sykes had previously expressed to him that the British Cabinet was seriously considering how it might bring the U.S. into the war “to win this thing.” Malcolm told him that, “you are going the wrong way about it. You can win the sympathy of certain politically minded Jews everywhere, and especially in the United States, in one way only, and that is by offering to try and secure Palestine for them.”(2)

SYKES-PICOT: DIVIDING UP THE OTTOMAN PIE
Palestine was indeed on Sykes mind, but he was not then considering it in the same light that he soon would. In late October 1915, the British had begun discussions with their French allies on the prospective partitioning of the Middle Eastern land holdings of the Ottoman Empire, if and when the Entente was able to win the First World War. Out of these discussions came the “Sykes-Picot Agreement,” officially ratified in May 1916, and named after its principal negotiators, Georges Picot, representing French interests, and Sir Mark Sykes, representing the interests of the British. The French wanted all of Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine, while the British sought to carve out a contiguous belt of territory from the eastern Mediterranean through Iraq, and encompassing southern Iran and the entire Persian Gulf (Russia only wanted northern Iran). This new British territory would be added on to all of Egypt and the Sinai, which they already controlled by 1914 as a “British Protectorate.” During these negotiations, the British gave the French what they wanted with regards to Lebanon and Syria, but in order to block French control of Palestine, Sykes sought to “internationalize” it, and to appease the French for the “loss,” he included the oil-rich area of Mosul in Northern Iraq as part of French Syria, which was to be administered by the Arabs, but under French control. All territory was divided up as either under direct European control and rule, or under European “influence,” but administered by the Arabs.(3)

LORD CREWE, A MAN AHEAD OF THE CURVE
Even before the Allied losses began their toll upon the alliance in the summer of 1916, a man ahead of the political and strategic curve, Lord Crewe, on March 11, 1916, communicated to the British ambassadors under his control in Petrograd and Paris that they propose to the other members of the Entente – Russia and France – a plan to sell their respective Jewish communities on the idea that if they gave their full support to the Allied war effort, Britain would back the Zionists’ national aspirations. He wrote at the time, the “Zionist idea has in it the most far-reaching political possibilities, for we might hope to use it in such a way as to bring over to our side the Jewish forces in America, the East [i.e. Russia] and elsewhere which are now largely, if not preponderantly hostile to us.”(4) In this regard, it is important to remember that this is the period in Germany and Austria before the rise of the Nazis. A great many of the Jewish immigrants to America in the late 19th and early 20th centuries were from both Germany and Russia. While the German Jews still loved their homeland, the Russian Jews hated the Czar and his pogroms. The Russian Jews in 1916-America were not about to support Britain, an ally of Czarist Russia, and likewise, the German Jews were not about to give any enthusiastic support to Britain, France, or Russia against Germany and Austria. These many intertwining histories, alliances and sympathies are very important to keep in mind when looking at this period of history.

1917 AND CHANGES OF GOVERNMENT
At the end of 1916, David Lloyd George became the new prime minister of Britain as the government of Herbert Henry Asquith fell. Lloyd George was genuinely sympathetic to Zionism and promoted the Zionists’ cause only four months into his leadership in order to persuade the new revolutionary government in Russia, many of whom were Jews, to remain supportive of Czarist Russia’s military commitments to the alliance. Although the London Zionists were fully aware that there was no Russian Jewish support for the Allied cause against Germany and its alliances, they nonetheless encouraged Lloyd George anyways, so that he would provide his full support to the pro-Zionist declaration that Chaim Weizmann and Lord Lionel Walter Rothschild began developing at that time in concert with Lord Balfour and others.(5) Aside from the hope that Russia would not leave the alliance, this support of the Zionist cause for a Jewish homeland in Palestine was also believed by the British to be helpful in encouraging prominent American Jews to persuade President Woodrow Wilson to bring America into the war on the side of the Entente.(6)

A ONE-MAN POLITICAL LOBBY
Leading the British lobbying effort on behalf of the World Zionist Organization (WZO) for granting Palestine to world Jewry was a man named Chaim Weizmann, who would later become the first president of the state of Israel, and remain in that post until his death in 1952. He was born in southern Russia in 1874 and became a British subject in 1910. From the start of the 20th century he became involved in the work of the World Zionist Organization (WZO), and was elected to its presidency twice in 1920-31 and 1935-46. In 1904 he received his PhD in chemistry from the University of Geneva in Switzerland, and in 1908 received a professorship at the University of Manchester in England. In 1916 he began working for the British government conducting research into advanced methods of munitions manufacturing.(7) While teaching in Manchester, he convinced influential gentleman such as C.P. Scott, the editor of the Manchester Guardian, of the worthiness of the Zionist national project, and during the War, in his employ with the British government, Weizmann brought other influential British ministers to his side, such as Sir Mark Sykes. He was able to persuasively blend the interests of Zionism as being both beneficial to, and compatible with, the interests of Britain. He was a formidable one-man lobby unto himself. (8)

Although British support for Zionism and the Balfour Declaration contained the ingredients of strategic short-term and long-term imperial interests, the British statesmen, such as Balfour, Lloyd George, and Sykes, who sympathized with the arguments of Weizmann and his colleagues, also did so out of a Christian cultural attachment to the Old Testament and the land of its origins, as well as out of pure human guilt for the European Christian treatment of the Jews. Chaim Weizmann, naturally skilled in the art of diplomacy, in private interviews with these influential gentlemen, was able to address his listeners’ religious, moral, or strategic interests, and harmonize them with the interests of Zionism. Sir Charles Webster remembers the persuasive, diplomatic skills of Mr. Weizmann and how he, “with unerring skill...adapted his arguments to the special circumstances of each statesman.”(9) It is the consensus of most historians that without Chaim Weizmann there would have been no Balfour Declaration.

C.P. SCOTT, PRESIDENT WOODROW WILSON AND U.S. “ISOLATIONISM”
C.P. Scott, the influential editor of the Manchester Guardian, was not only a close confidant of Chaim Weizmann, but was also good friends with British Prime Minister David Lloyd George. He believed that the support of the Zionists, and thus the support of world Jewry, would bring benefit to the Jews and, at the same time, serve Britain’s short-term and long-term strategic interests with regards to the immediate war effort and future efforts to maintain control and protection over the Suez Canal. Simultaneous control over both Egypt and Palestine would assure the imperial preservation of the Canal – His Majesty’s lifeline to the other side of the Empire in India, Burma, and the East.(10)

On December 18, 1916, in a speech which rattled the nerves of the British war cabinet and the European Zionist lobby, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson called for an end to the senseless carnage in Europe by saying that what must be sought is a “peace without victory.” As would be expressed later in his historic “Fourteen Points Speech” delivered to the U.S. Congress on January 8, 1918, Wilson understood the moral problems of colonialism and imperialism, and gave his support to the ideas of ethnic and national self-determination, autonomy, and territorial integrity for both large and small states equally.(11) Understanding Wilson’s sympathies and positions on these matters, it was Chaim Weizmann’s friend, C.P. Scott, who suggested to the British cabinet that they justify the upcoming Fall 1917 campaign to occupy Palestine as being one conducted on behalf of world Jewry and Zionist national aspirations for self-determination and autonomy. In this way, the American Jews close to Wilson could explain to him the upcoming British occupation in these terms so that he would give support to it, and that it might further encourage him to provide American military support to the Entente’s war efforts.(12) Louis Brandeis, head of the Zionist organization in the United States and a U.S. Supreme Court Justice was encouraged by Weizmann and Sykes to persuade his close friend, President Woodrow Wilson, to bring America into the war, provide the Jewish people with a homeland, and snatch victory from the jaws of certain defeat for Britain and the Free World. Other American Zionist powerbrokers, such as Paul Warburg (the founder of the private bank known as the “Federal Reserve Bank”), Jacob Schiff, and Bernard Baruch also met with the President on these matters. In April 1917, the U.S. officially declared war on Germany, but President Wilson only initially sent over a small, token military force (see: Vietnam). It was not until nine months later, in January 1918, two months after the Balfour Declaration, that large U.S. military units would arrive in Europe to assist the British and French in the fighting.(13)

REVOLUTION AND SIR MARK SYKES AS MASTER JUGGLER
Before the big British campaign into Palestine in the autumn of 1917 could commence, however, revolution was in the air inside Russia, and the outcome was not looking favorable to the Allied cause. The now historic 1917 Russian Revolution consisted of two insurrections: one in March, which toppled the Czarist monarchy and established a republic, and the second in November, which put the Bolsheviks in power. In March 1917, the new Russian republic was already rejecting the imperialist plans of dividing territories after the Great War, and by the time the Bolsheviks seized power in November 1917, the Triple Entente was down to two members – Britain and France. The Bolsheviks in December signed a peace agreement with the Germans, and after the French Army staged a temporary mutiny in the spring of 1917, the British were lucky to have anyone fighting beside them at all. A thumbs up on the question of Jewish nationalism was suddenly the obvious way to promote needed support for the war effort in Russia, France, and the United States.(14) After the “Great War,” Sir Winston Churchill remarked, “The Balfour Declaration must, therefore, not be regarded as a promise given from sentimental motives; it was a practical measure taken in the interests of a common cause at a moment when that cause could afford to neglect no factor of material or moral assistance.”(15)

Through the summer and autumn of 1917, intelligence rumours circulated that the Germans were about to make their own pro-Zionist proclamation to entice Russia to leave the war. Later, Prime Minister Lloyd George confirmed the intelligence, saying: “There is no better proof of the value of the Balfour Declaration as a military move than the fact that Germany entered into negotiations with Turkey [the controllers of Palestine] in an endeavor to provide an alternative scheme which would appeal to the Zionists.”(16) In response to this situation, there was a meeting of the British war cabinet on the last day of October in 1917, and at this meeting, Lord Balfour presented the following argument in favor of an immediate pro-Zionist declaration by His Majesty’s government:

“From a purely diplomatic and political point of view, it was desirable that some declaration favorable to the aspirations of the Jewish nationalists should now be made. The vast majority of Jews in Russia and America, as indeed all over the world, now appeared to be favorable to Zionism. If we could make a declaration favorable to such an ideal, we should be able to carry on extremely useful propaganda both in Russia and in America.”(17)

For the British to simultaneously take Palestine by the late Autumn of 1917, and appeal to President Wilson’s anti-imperialist concerns, both the French and the Americans would need to be finessed. In 1917, as Assistant Secretary to the war cabinet to oversee Middle Eastern affairs, Mark Sykes would have to find a way to amend his own Sykes-Picot Agreement. He thus came to view the government’s alliance with British Zionism as “providing a way to outmanoeuvre the French without breaking faith, and a useful card at the future peace conference to play against any move by Germany to rally the German-oriented and Turcophile Jews to buttress her claim for a role in the region.”(18) To appease Wilson and the Americans, the British seizure of Palestine would be done to support the idea of Jewish self-determination in Palestine, and thus “provided a cloak under which Britain could appear free from any annexationist taint.”(19) The appeasement of French concerns was achieved in June 1917 when the French foreign minister Jules Combon told Sykes that his government supported “the renaissance of Jewish nationality” in Palestine, if only to encourage the Jews of Russia to persuade their new provisional government to keep Russian forces fighting for the triple alliance.(20)

THE BALFOUR DECLARATION
In June of 1917 the British government invited the titular leader of the Jewish community in Britain, Lord Lionel Walter Rothschild, to submit official Jewish proposals regarding Palestine.(21) Five months later, on November 2, 1917, British Foreign Minister, Arthur J. Balfour signed and delivered an official letter to Lord Rothschild. The official declaration within this letter, which became known as the Balfour Declaration, comprised three integral concepts in a single sentence. The letter stated in full:

Dear Lord Rothschild,
I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty’s Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet.

“His Majesty’s Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.”

I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation.

Yours,
Arthur James Balfour (22)

Between June and November of 1917, intensive discussions took place, and a single declaratory sentence became a composite of three separate, vented concerns regarding a single international situation, the ramifications of which haunt us and torture us to this very day. Chaim Weizmann lobbied for the phrase, “the reconstitution of Palestine as a Jewish State and as the National Home of the Jewish People.” Weizmann objected to the idea of the establishment of a Jewish national home “in Palestine,” for then that would allow for the Arab majority to administer the state. His demand was, “give the Arabs all the guarantees they like for cultural autonomy; but the State must be Jewish.”(23) Despite the establishment of a Jewish State over the whole of Palestine as having been the original Zionist objective, Lord Rothschild, in consultation with other Zionist leaders, felt that Weizmann was asking for too much, too soon, and overruled him with the phrasing of Palestine being recognized by the British as “the National Home of the Jewish People, and that in Palestine, the World Zionist Organization (WZO) would be accepted by them as an autonomous, self-governing body.(24)

The second clause of the Balfour Declaration was lobbied for inclusion by Lord Milner, a member of the cabinet who felt that in the land of Palestine the Jewish people should be allowed to find a shelter and a home, but he objected to the Jews all of a sudden forming an instant, unitary “nationhood” and demanding possession of the entire land of Palestine. He asked that it be “clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, i.e. the Arab Muslims and Christians which made up 92% of the Palestinian population in 1917. It is interesting how the 92% majority population of Palestine is referred to as the “existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine,” giving the illusion of an insignificant minority, one subordinate to the new incoming Jewish “majority.” Lord Milner lobbied for the insertion of this simple phrase out of his concern for not only the welfare of the Arab Palestinians, but also out of concern for British interests in Egypt and India.(25) In tracing the Balfour Declaration’s final developmental stages, Isaiah Friedman points out that Lord Milner’s original phraseology, asking the Zionists to respect the “political, civil, and religious rights” of the majority population was edited out in the final version, and replaced with the guaranteed protection of “civil and religious” rights only. The idea behind this edit was that when the Zionist community attained to majority status, “political rights” would be theirs alone.(26)

The last clause of the declarative sentence known as the Balfour Declaration – “it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice...the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country,” was there because of Edwin Montagu, the only Jew in the British war cabinet, and as Theodore Herzl would have derisively called him, an “assimilated Jew.” Montagu was Secretary of State for India, and while lobbying for the inclusion of this third clause, was in fact entirely against the Zionist national project altogether. He felt that the establishment of a “Jewish” state in Palestine would define Jews as a “separate nation,” and that this in turn would threaten the long-established communities of Jews who had assimilated into the societies where they had long lived as citizens. Judaism to Montgu was a religion and a culture, not a “nation.” He believed strongly that emphasizing the distinctiveness of the Jews as a separate “nation,” might give rise to a new era of European anti-Semitism. Charges of dual-loyalty would surely arise and be exacerbated by British support of Zionist nationalism. British Jews, he feared, might be asked to renounce their citizenship and move to the new “Jewish” State.(27) Commenting on the third clause of the Balfour Declaration, the Palestinian Christian scholar Sami Hadawi wrote, “This latter protective clause gave the Jews the homeland of another people while safeguarding their own rights in their countries of origin!”(28)

While the Zionists were always quick to quote the Balfour Declaration’s statement that “His Majesty’s Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object,” they were not always so quick to cite the second part of the sentence which says, “It being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine,” i.e. the Muslim and Christian inhabitants which made up 92% of the population in 1917.(29)

NOVEMBER 3, 1917, THE BALFOUR DECLARATION PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN COMMENCES
The promotion department went into high gear on the very next day following Lord Lionel Walter Rothschild’s receipt of a letter upon which was written a single sentence, and signed by the hand of Lord Arthur James Balfour on behalf of His Majesty’s government. German and Austrian troops were bombarded by leaflets falling from the sky announcing that the Entente supported Jewish self-determination, and that Jews should look to the Entente. The Jews of Russia celebrated the Balfour Declaration, however, the Bolsheviks, after taking power five days later on November 7, 1917, soon took Russia out of the Triple Entente by the middle of December. In America, Jewish groups began the immediate organization of a campaign to promote a greater commitment by the United States to the war effort, which until January of 1918 had only committed a token force of men, and primarily concentrated on supplying the Allied powers with the supplies needed for Allied war efforts. The Balfour Declaration-driven pro-war campaign seemed to work, because in January of 1918 President Woodrow Wilson was convinced that entering the war was the proper thing to do, and it was at that time that he finally agreed to commit large detachments of American troops to the battle.(30)

Concerning America’s entry into the First World War, it may seem provocative or controversial to say it was due to Zionist influence on the American president, yet this arrangement between the Zionist movement and the British government was quite explicitly expressed by former British Prime Minister David Lloyd George when he appeared in 1937 before the Palestine Royal (Peel) Commission. In paragraph sixteen of the Report it is stated, “The Zionist leaders (Mr. Lloyd George informed us) gave us a definite promise that, if the Allies committed themselves to giving facilities for the establishment of a national home for the Jews in Palestine, they would do their best to rally Jewish sentiment and support throughout the world to the Allied cause. They kept their word.”(31)

After understanding the history of the Balfour Declaration and the promotional campaign it inspired to bring America into the First World War, it is fascinating to look around in today’s modern world of mass media and political think-tankdom and take note of who the loudest drumbeaters always are, and have been, for the wars against Iraq, Iran, Syria, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Pakistan, etc. After all, it was Binyamin Netanyahu who originally coined and trademarked the phrase “War on Terror” back in ’85.

Tune in next time, same station, for the rest of Part Three A:
Palestine – The Balfour Declaration to the Zionist “War of Independence”

1. America’s Entry into the First World War & the Balfour Declaration (posted here)

2. 1930-1949, Two Decades of Zionist Terrorism in Palestine

2a. Vladimir Jabotinsky, “Betar,” “the Irgun,” and the Zionist Revisionist Movement

2b. The Zionist Underground: History, Ideology and Operations

3. The Weissmandl documents – “Zionists brought us to the Holocaust.”

And Part Three B: Post-World War II – The Art of the International Zionist False Flag Operation.

(1) Gordon, Cyrus H, Ugarit and Minoan Crete: The Bearing of Their Texts on the Origins of Western Culture. New York: W.W. Norton. 1966, p. 61.

In a translation of Canaanite religious poetry from the Ugaritic language, the supreme deity of the Canaanite pantheon El sits in his festival house and declares, “The name of my son is Yw-El,” and all the gods proclaimed him. Professor Cyrus H. Gordon of Brandeis University writes in his footnote to this verse: “Yw-El is the son of the head of the pantheon. This suggests that ‘Yahweh’ (‘Yw’) was originally El’s son in pre-Israelite Canaan. It is unusual for a younger god to eclipse the older gods in the development of religion. In other words, just as Zeus eclipsed his father Cronus, Yahweh eclipsed his father El. Subsequently, Hebrew monotheism necessitated the identification of Yahweh with El.”

(2) Malcolm, James, Origins of the Balfour Declaration. Zionist Archives. pp. 2-3. Cited in Sami Hadawi, Bitter Harvest: A Modern History of Palestine. New York: Olive Branch Press. 1991, p. 12.

(3) Wise, Stephen & De Haas, Jacob, The Great Betrayal. New York: Brentano’s. 1930, p. 288.

(4) Lloyd George, David, Memoirs of the Peace Conference, Vol. II. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1939, p. 738.

(5) Zipperstein, Steven J., Elusive Prophet: Ahad Ha’am and the Origins of Zionism. Berkeley: University of California Press. 1993, p. 301.

(6) Smith, Charles D., Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History with Documents, 4th Edition. Boston-New York: Bedford/St. Martin’s. 2001, p. 71.

(7) Encyclopedia of World History,” ed. Patrick K. O’Brien, et al. New York: Facts on File, Inc. 2000, pp. 434-35.

(8) Smith, Charles D., Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History with Documents, 4th Edition. Boston-New York: Bedford/St. Martin’s. 2001, p. 71.

(9) Webster, Sir Charles K., The Art and Practice of Diplomacy. London: Chatto & Windus. 1961, pp. 5-6.

(10) Smith, Charles D., Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History with Documents, 4th Edition. Boston-New York: Bedford/St. Martin’s. 2001, p. 73.

(11) Dictionary of Historic Documents, (Rev. Ed.). George Childs Kohn (Ed.). New York: Facts on File. 2003, pp. 159-60.

(12) Smith, Charles D., Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History with Documents, 4th Edition. Boston-New York: Bedford/St. Martin’s. 2001, p. 73.

(13) Ibid. p. 74.

(14) Ibid. p. 74.

(15) Ibid. pp. 67-8.

(16) Friedman, Isaiah, The Question of Palestine, 1914-1918: British-Jewish-Arab Relations. New York: Routledge. 1973, p. 57.

(17) Smith, Charles D., Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History with Documents, 4th Edition. Boston-New York: Bedford/St. Martin’s. 2001, p. 75.

(18) Friedman, Isaiah, The Question of Palestine, 1914-1918: British-Jewish-Arab Relations. New York: Routledge. 1973, p. 126.

(19) Ibid. p. 175.

(20) Smith, Charles D., Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History with Documents, 4th Edition. Boston-New York: Bedford/St. Martin’s. 2001, p. 74.

(21) Ibid. p. 74.

(22) Ibid. p. 75.

(23) Ibid. p. 74.

(24) Friedman, Isaiah, The Question of Palestine, 1914-1918: British-Jewish-Arab Relations. New York: Routledge. 1973, pp. 252-53.

(25) Smith, Charles D., Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History with Documents, 4th Edition. Boston-New York: Bedford/St. Martin’s. 2001, p. 75.

(26) Friedman, Isaiah, The Question of Palestine, 1914-1918: British-Jewish-Arab Relations. New York: Routledge. 1973, pp. 275-80.

(27) Smith, Charles D., Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History with Documents, 4th Edition. Boston-New York: Bedford/St. Martin’s. 2001, p. 75.

(28) Hadawi, Sami, Bitter Harvest: A Modern History of Palestine. New York: Olive Branch Press. 1991, p. 13.

(29) Ibid. p. 13.

(30) Smith, Charles D., Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History with Documents, 4th Edition. Boston-New York: Bedford/St. Martin’s. 2001, p. 76.

(31) Palestine Royal (Peel) Commission Report CMD 5479. London. 1946, p. 17.