Meet the Mythmakers: Joshua Gleis
Interesting pile of BS...
Connecting the Dots: Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda Involvement in Terrorism Prior to 9/11
On the night of November 5, 1990, El Sayid Nosair walked into the Marriot East Side Hotel, pulled out a .357 chrome-plated magnum pistol and shot one bullet into the neck of Rabbi Meir Kahane. Kahane was dead on arrival at the hospital. An engineer by trade, 34-year-old Nosair had donned a knit yarmulke, a religious garment worn by many followers of Kahane, the leader of the radical extremist group known as the Jewish Defense League. As he attempted to flee the scene, Nosair shot 73-year-old Irving Franklin in the leg when he tried to stop him. After jumping out of a taxi cab he had thought was his getaway car, Nosair fired once again, this time hitting a Postal Service Police Officer before being shot and wounded himself.1 Long after Kahane’s funeral, few people realized what type of person they had in custody. El Sayid Nosair was a critical connection to members of what would become Al Qaeda; a connection that was overlooked by members of the U.S. intelligence agencies. So began the first link in the long trail that led to the attacks on September 11th, 2001.
Connecting the Dots
The Assassination of Meir Kahane
A number of arrests were made following Meir Kahane’s assassination. Soon after Nosair’s arrest, accomplices of his were taken into custody as well. These accomplices included an Egyptian named Bilall Alkaisi, a Palestinian named Mohammed Salameh, and the man who was supposed to be driving Nosair’s getaway car, Mahmoud Abouhalima. All of these men were set free a short time after their arrests. The Egyptian “Blind Sheikh” Omar Abdel Rahman, who served as Nosair’s spiritual advisor, was suspected of involvement but was never taken into custody. All the men discussed here would later become important members of the 1993 World Trade Center cell.2
The defense of El Sayyid Nosair became a rallying cry for jihadist extremists around the world. A defense fund was established for Nosair, with donors including the likes of Osama bin Laden.3 In the end, despite dozens of witnesses who had viewed Kahane’s murder, Nosair was not convicted for the Rabbi’s murder. Instead, Nosair was convicted only of shooting Franklin and Postal Officer Carlos Acosta, and was sentenced to 7.5–22.5 years in prison. The importance of the conviction (or lack thereof) was that it demonstrated to Islamic radicals that even with witnesses and strong evidence, the U.S. criminal justice system was soft and could easily be overcome.4
Another noteworthy development occurred during the investigation into Nosair and his accomplices following the Kahane murder. A whole slew of important information was collected and subsequently overlooked. This included files of New York City landmarks, copies of teletypes from the Secretary of the Army and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, bomb-making manuals, and hit lists of Jewish leaders and sympathetic politicians.5
While Nosair’s files and tapes were originally confiscated by the NYPD, they were never reviewed. Rather, they were collected by the FBI before they could be translated and were later sent to the Manhattan District Attorney’s office, where they were misplaced. Part of the reason for this was that there was confusion over who would lead the overall investigation. When the FBI discovered that it would not be the lead agency in charge, its interest in the investigation virtually vanished.6 Additionally, there was serious pressure within the NYPD to put an end to this affair as quickly as possible. As a result, when members of the NYPD-FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force attempted to investigate this murder as part of a larger conspiracy, their request was denied. Instead, the assassination was declared the work of a “lone, deranged gunman.”7 In the months and years that would lead to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, a number of actors involved in future attacks against the United States would visit Nosair in jail to discuss potential strikes.
1993 World Trade Center (WTC) Attack
On February 26, 1993, at 12:17 p.m., a Ryder truck filled with fuel oil, fertilizer, and nitroglycerin boosters exploded in the B-2 level of the WTC parking garage, killing six people, and injuring over one thousand. The attack was planned by Ramzi Yousef with the support of Nosair’s accomplices, including Mohammed Salameh, who rented the van and was later arrested when he stupidly tried to pick up the deposit.8 Yousef had traveled to the United States with Mohammed Ajaj, who attempted to enter the United States with a stolen Swiss passport. A subsequent search of Ajaj’s bags found that they contained false passports, bomb-making manuals, a surveillance training guidebook, and instructional videos on different weaponry. For this, Ajaj was charged with six months in prison. Yousef, though, having claimed asylum from Saddam Hussein’s regime with a false Iraqi passport, was released after he promised to return for a hearing—there was not enough room for him in the INS holding area.9
Yousef left JFK International Airport and met up with Nosair’s former getaway driver, Mahmoud Abouhalima. He was given a place to live and was introduced to Nosair’s accomplices as well as Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman. Nosair’s accomplices had been plotting to attack a series of Jewish targets, but the scheme, known as the “Twelve Jewish Locations” plot, was believed by Yousef to be too limited in its scope. Having the expertise to build the necessary bombs and plan the attack, he gained the respect of the group and convinced them to instead focus on attacking the World Trade Center.10 Only after the 1993 World Trade Center bombings occurred and long after Yousef had fled the country and was on his way back to Pakistan did the U.S. government finally translate and review the materials originally confiscated from Nosair’s apartment. It was then that the FBI and other law enforcement agencies made the connection between the Kahane assassination and the 1993 terrorist attack.11
1998 Embassy Bombings
The 1998 U.S. embassy bombings brought the names “Osama bin Laden” and “Al Qaeda” into the mainstream for the first time. Before 1998, only a handful of people had known much about Al Qaeda, and Bin Laden himself was seen by and large only as a terrorist financier.12 Much like the 1993 World Trade Center bombings, there were a number of events that took place before the 1998 embassy bombings that could have helped prevent the attacks had they been properly investigated and taken more seriously. Perhaps the most glaring example is that of Mustafa Mahmoud Said Ahmed. In November 1997, Ahmed walked into the U.S. embassy in Nairobi and warned of an impending attack; yet, due to his past record, his warning was disregarded by the CIA. The Ahmed example is just one lead that could have possibly prevented the 1998 Embassy bombings.
As previously mentioned, following the arrest of Nosair, a number of jihadists came to visit him in jail. One member central to the 1998 bombing was Ali Mohamed, a former soldier in the Egyptian Army and a U.S. Special Forces officer at the time. Mohamed was the man who had provided Nosair with copies of teletypes from the Secretary of the Army and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Another key player in the 1998 bombing was Wadih el-Hage. El-Hage was a Lebanese convert to Islam, a disciple of Abdullah Azzam (the founder and former leader of Al Qaeda), and personal secretary to Osama bin Laden for three years. El-Hage also helped secure weapons for the 1993 World Trade Center attack.13 Unlike some other members connected to the 1993 bombings, the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) did approach El-Hage when he was residing in Kenya and tried to convince him to discuss Al Qaeda. Soon after El-Hage rejected the JTTF offer, he returned with his family to the United States. Consequently, the surveillance “bugs” that had been planted in his home in Kenya were removed, despite the fact that other members of the Kenya cell were using the home and a letter written to Al Qaeda Communications Director Fawwaz was found in El-Hage’s files. In the letter, El-Hage discussed other cell members and the “engineers” soon to arrive in Kenya. At the same time, reports were coming in from other channels within the FBI, CIA, State Department, Mossad, and Kenyan intelligence, all of which warned of a potential plot involving a Kenyan terrorist cell. Yet, the departure of El-Hage from Kenya led the U.S. government to believe that any potential plot had been sufficiently disrupted for the time being.14
On August 7, 1998, the U.S. government was proven wrong again. At 10:35 a.m., a bomb-laden truck blew up outside the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, killing 12 Americans, 201 others (mostly Kenyan), and injuring approximately 5,000 people. Four minutes later on the same day, this time in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, a second bomb-laden truck blew up outside the U.S. Embassy, killing another eleven people.
2000 U.S.S. Cole Attack
Unfortunately, the connections continued: The main player in the 2000 attack on the U.S.S. Cole was tied to the 1998 Embassy bombings. Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri (a.k.a. Mohammed Omar al-Harazi), was the cousin of the Nairobi suicide bomber, the organizer of the first Al Qaeda cell in South Asia, and the head of the Aden cell in Yemen. Having failed at a first attempt to attack an American warship in the Aden Harbor, Al Qaeda managed to get it right on October 12, 2000.15 This occurred despite a warning by a high-ranking informant in an Egyptian jihad group who had cautioned that a potential attack on a U.S. warship in the Middle East was being planned. Nevertheless, because ships in the Middle East were already on high alert, no further security measures were taken.
On October 12, 2000, after pulling into Aden harbor, the U.S.S. Cole was bombed, with 294 American sailors onboard. The attack was carried out with the use of a small boat and two men onboard. They simply sailed up to the warship, waved to some of the American shipmen, and detonated the explosives on board. The explosion nearly sunk the warship, leaving a massive hole on the starboard side, killing seventeen sailors and wounding another forty.16
Had another country attacked a U.S. warship and caused such injury, the likelihood of the United States going to war with that country would have been high. Yet, before 9/11, the mood of the United States was noticeably different. Not only did the suicide attack raise few fears of a future attack on U.S. soil, but Ambassador Bodine, who was America’s highest representative in Yemen at the time, actually turned down a request to send a large number of U.S. investigators to the city, fearing a “small invasion” of Yemen.17
Averted Attacks
While the United States suffered many terrorist attacks in the years leading up to 9/11, some of which have been listed here, a number of potentially deadly attacks were averted by American authorities. These attacks are important to discuss briefly because many of them were carried out and supported by the terrorists listed here. The names are underlined for reference purposes. Many of these averted attacks led to the wrong lessons being learned by U.S. government agencies.
1993 Landmarks Plot
This plot was orchestrated directly by the Blind Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman. The plan was to blow up a number of major American landmarks in New York City. These included the Lincoln Tunnel, the Holland Tunnel, the United Nations building, and 26 Federal Plaza, the FBI’s New York headquarters. Although the prevented strike was given relatively little coverage by the media, the plot was in its final stages when members of the cell were taken into custody. If the arrests had been planned for a few days later it is very possible that the events of 9/11 would have paled in comparison.18
1995 Bojinka Plot
This 1995 scheme, contrived by Ramzi Yousef and Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, was designed to destroy up to twelve U.S.-bound aircraft using undetectable explosives that had been manufactured by Yousef. A small amount of the explosives were actually tested by Yousef when he placed them in a contact lens case and boarded a passenger jet. Having been preprogrammed to detonate on the next flight, the bomb exploded on Flight 434 from Manila to Tokyo, killing one passenger and tearing a hole through the aircraft that nearly caused the plane to crash. As planned, Yousef had safely left the plane after its earlier flight.19 Additionally, Yousef and Mohammed planned to assassinate Pope John Paul II during his visit to Manila. An alternative plan was to fly a plane into CIA headquarters and perhaps other U.S. landmarks; strikingly similar to the attack on the Pentagon on 9/11.20
1997 Subway Plot
Although small when compared to the plots listed earlier, this scheme is reminiscent of what many Americans fear is going to take place in the future on U.S. soil. In 1998, Gazi Ibrahim Abu Mezer, Lafi Khalil, and Abdul Rahman Mossabah had planned to blow up several major New York City subways. There was also an additional plan to hit other U.S. and Jewish interests. When the men were arrested in a Brooklyn apartment, pipe bombs were found in the building.21
2000 Millennium Plot
In preparation for the 2000 millennium celebrations planned around the world, intelligence agencies increased their vigilance and braced for attack. Although no significant incidents took place, there were at least two averted schemes worth noting. One included Ahmed Resam (a.k.a. “Benni Norris”), who was arrested at Port Angeles, Washington, while trying to enter the United States from Canada. His car was loaded with 100 lbs. of explosives intended to blow up an LAX airport terminal. A suspicious U.S. border guard discovered the explosives when asking Resam to open his trunk. Resam appeared very nervous and anxious. Additionally, Raed Hijazi (a.k.a. “Abu Ahmed the American”) attempted to blow up thousands of Christian pilgrims who had come to Jordan’s holy Christian sites to celebrate the millennium. Hijazi had also planned to bomb the Marriot hotel in Amman. Jordanian intelligence agents were successful in stopping those attacks from taking place.22
Wrong Lessons Learned
The averted attacks discussed here left many in the U.S. intelligence community and the public at-large with a false sense of security. The uncovering of these plots should be commended. However, in the case of the Bojinka plot, the United States can thank the fire that broke out in Yousef’s apartment, which led to the detection of his plans.23 Regardless of how these plots were discovered, a number of wrong lessons were taken away from them. First, the findings reinforced to members of the FBI and Justice Department that they were capable of preventing acts of terrorism with the necessary tools to do so. Second, the findings suggested to Americans that terrorism was not a serious threat to the national security of the United States.
Another important point that needed to be taken away from the plots, one that was arguably recognized by some only after the 1998 bombings, was that Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda were interested in killing mass numbers of Americans. Terrorism expert Brian Jenkins’s old idea that terrorism was only a tactic for media attention, and thus did not need mass casualties to meet its cause, was proven false by these global jihadists.24 Outlined here are two additional acts of terrorism. Although not attributable to Al Qaeda per se, they are important to highlight because they further demonstrate the wrong lessons that were taken away from acts of terror prior to 9/11. As the 9/11 Commission Report stated in its analysis of U.S. prosecution of terrorism cases, “although the bombings heightened awareness of a new terrorist danger, successful prosecutions contributed to widespread underestimations of the threat.”25
March 1, 1994: Air Halberstam Murder
Less than one week before the Halberstam murder, Brooklyn-born Baruch Goldstein murdered Muslims while they were in prayer at the Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron, a site holy to both Jews and Muslims. Just days later, on March 1, 1994, approximately twenty vehicles carrying Hassidic Jews were returning from a visit to the Hasidic spiritual leader Rabbi Menachem Schneerson, who was recovering from surgery at the Manhattan Eye, Ear and Throat Hospital.26
Near the Brooklyn Bridge waited a Lebanese national named Rashid Baz. Armed with a submachine gun, two 9-mm pistols, and a shotgun, Baz fired on one of the vans that was carrying fifteen students, yelling in Arabic “kill the Jews.” Sixteen-year-old Ari Halberstam was killed in the attack. Three other children were shot and wounded. Rashid Baz was sentenced to 141 years in prison. For years, the New York Police Department categorized the attack as “road rage.” Only in 2000, after more than half a decade of lobbying by politicians and Halberstam’s mother was the type of attack correctly categorized as an act of terror. The lesson learned by the law enforcement community from this attack was that acts of terror, especially when they are small, should be downplayed so as to not cause panic in the city.27
December 26, 1994: Air France Hijacking
On August 24, 1994, four members of the Armed Islamic Group (AIG), disguised as airport security guards, hijacked Air France Flight 8969 in Algiers, Algeria. With miniature AK-47s, hand grenades, and other explosives planted on the Airbus jet, the terrorists requested permission to fly on to Marseilles. Although the Algerian government was eager to launch an attack of their own, the French were adamantly against this. After over twelve hours of waiting, the terrorists eventually killed a French national, and the aircraft was finally allowed to take off.28
Once in Marseilles, an Algerian police officer and Vietnamese diplomat were dragged to the front of the plane and shot. Although the terrorists said they wanted to fly to Paris, they requested enough fuel to fly three times that distance. French intelligence had reported the terrorists wanted to blow the plane up over Paris, and so the GIGN “Super Gendarmes” chose to storm the plane. They succeeded in killing all the terrorists and rescuing all of the remaining passengers. The GIGN performed the rescue operation nearly flawlessly. It was later learned, however, that the terrorists were interested in either blowing up the plane over Paris or even into the Eiffel Tower.
Although the U.S. government did study the GIGN rescue operation, it did not focus on the importance of what the ultimate goals of the AIG terrorists were: to use a passenger jet as a missile to blow up a building.29 Once again, an important opportunity was missed that could have possibly led to U.S. officials being better prepared for a 9/11-type scenario.
Conclusions
The purpose of this article was not simply to point out the flaws in the intelligence and law enforcement agencies of the United States but, rather, to highlight the connections that were missed so as to prevent such oversights from taking place in the future. Before 9/11, the main problem was not so much that the United States did not have the necessary agencies in place to detect terrorist attacks. Instead, the United States did not have the proper mechanisms and laws in place to make sure that these agencies could do their jobs effectively. For example, when Wadih el-Hage returned to the United States, the CIA was required to remove the eavesdropping devices that had been placed in his Kenyan home. Had those devices been left on, crucial information about the upcoming embassy bombings could have been collected.30
From the activity of Ramzi Yousef, law enforcement agencies should have been notified of the differences that were evident between him and other terrorists like El Sayid Nosair. Yousef was not only a more professional terrorist in terms of his weapons expertise but also in his overall behavior. Much like the bombers of 9/11, Yousef tended to dress more Western-like in appearance, did not preach jihad to members outside of his immediate cell, and was courteous to people he met and interacted with in public.31 Such characteristics could later be used to describe 9/11 terrorist mastermind Mohammed Atta.
Following the 1998 embassy bombings, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright asked the U.S. Ambassador Bushnell to Nairobi, “How could this have happened?” The answer was really quite simple. The embassy complex had previously belonged to the Israelis, who had left it because they felt it was not sufficiently secure. Even while the FBI, CIA, Mossad, and Kenyan intelligence all warned of a Kenyan terrorist cell, the U.S. Ambassador’s requests for additional security from the State Department was rejected. The ambassador was furious when asked how such a thing could happen.32
The terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001, transformed the national security priorities of the United States dramatically. Practically overnight, laws and security measures that had been proposed for years were implemented. Intelligence today still points to continued threat by Al Qaeda and other global jihadists. This article has attempted to highlight links that were largely ignored and culminated in the greatest terrorist attack in U.S. history.
1. A Lone Gunman (accessed October 23, 2006); available from http://www.crimelibrary.com/terrorists_spies/terrorists/elsayid_nosair/i....
2. John Miller and Michael Stone, The Cell (New York: Hyperion, 2003) p 76.
3. Richard A. Clarke, Against All Enemies (New York: Free Press, 2004) p 79.
4. John Miller and Michael Stone, The Cell (New York: Hyperion, 2003) p 76.
6. John Miller and Michael Stone, The Cell (New York: Hyperion, 2003) p 55.
7. Profile: El Sayyid Nosair (accessed October 13, 2006); available from http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/entity.jsp?id=1521846767–1826.
8. The 9/11 Commission Report (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2002) p 72.
9. Richard A. Clarke, Against All Enemies (New York: Free Press, 2004) p 77.
10. John Miller, Michael Stone, The Cell (New York: Hyperion, 2003) p 88.
11. Al Qaeda (accessed October 23, 2006); available from http://cfrterrorism.org/groups/alqaeda.html.
12. Michael Dobbs, “Inside the Mind of Osama Bin Laden,” Washington Post, September 20, 2001, A01.
13. A Portrait of Wadih El-Hage, Accused Terrorist (accessed October 23, 2006); available from http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/upclose/elhage.ht....
14. John Miller, Michael Stone, The Cell (New York: Hyperion, 2003) pp 201–204.
15. Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda (New York: Berkeley Book, 2002) p 66.
16. The 9/11 Commission Report (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2002) p 190.
17. The Man Who Knew (accessed October 23, 2006); available from http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/knew/interviews/guenther.h....
18. The 9/11 Commission Report (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2002) p 72 and New York Landmarks Plot (accessed October 23, 2006); available from http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/profiles/new_york_landmarks_plot.....
19. John Miller, Michael Stone, The Cell (New York: Hyperion, 2003) p 123.
20. Complete 9/11 Timeline (accessed October 23, 2006); available from http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/timeline.jsp?warning_signs:_specific_....
21. Terrorist Plot to Bomb New York City Subway System (accessed October 23, 2006); available from http://www.emergency.com/ternyc97.htm.
22. 60 Minutes II: The Millenium Plot (accessed October 23, 2006); available from http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2001/10/03/60II/main313398.shtml.
24. Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998) p 38.
25. The 9/11 Commission Report (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2002) p 72.
26. Sequence of Events (accessed October 23, 2006); available from http://www.arihalberstam.com/php/1.php.
27. Terror & Denial (accessed October 23, 2006); available from http://www.meforum.org/article/pipes/431.
28. Al-Qaida plot to hijack plane in UK (accessed October 23, 2006); available from http://freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/969506/posts.
29. Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda (New York: Berkeley Book, 2002) p 164.
30. John Miller, Michael Stone, The Cell (New York: Hyperion, 2003) p 204.
31. John Miller, Michael Stone, The Cell (New York: Hyperion, 2003) p 77.
32. John Miller, Michael Stone, The Cell (New York: Hyperion, 2003) pp 204–205.
Joshua Gleis is a Research Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Studies at Harvard University and a PhD Candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. As an analyst at the Jebsen Center for Counter Terrorism Studies at Tufts University’s Fletcher School, his areas of focus are counterterrorism, counterinsurgencies, and the Middle East.
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old article on Gleis
Joshua Gleis, PhD Candidate and Rabble Rouser
Joshua Gleis is known to many as one of the strongest pro-Israel voices at Fletcher. He has taken on that role in roundtable discussions at Fletcher’s Fares Center for Eastern Mediterranean Studies and on social list-serve debates because he feels that there needs to be a balanced voice. A dual Israeli and U.S. citizen, issues relating to the Middle East are close to his heart, but he certainly does not see them in a vacuum. He speaks up, even when his opinions are unpopular or in the minority; as a result, he has inspired positive action in his community and forced others to think about their own views more deeply, and articulate them more clearly.
For his MALD degree at Fletcher, Gleis focused on International Security Studies, and International Negotiation and Conflict Resolution. His 2005 MALD thesis looked at “how Israeli counter-terrorism can be incorporated by the United States.” Now as a PhD candidate, Gleis intends to elaborate upon his thesis and conduct a comparative case study of counter-terrorism in the UK and Israel, exploring how other democratic states can use the lessons learned to combat terrorism on their own soil. Before coming to Fletcher, Gleis did a variety of things. After working as a campaign manager for a candidate for the New York State Assembly in 2001, he acted as a part-time spokesperson for the Israeli consulate. He then dabbled in direct marketing and even started his own company importing Christian religious articles from Israel. For the six months before his first semester at Fletcher, Gleis was the Assistant Director of the New Jersey and Eastern Pennsylvania division of Young Judea, a Jewish youth movement.
A volunteer firefighter during his undergraduate days at Cornell University, Gleis was profoundly affected by the events of September 11. Responding to a radio report calling all with firefighting experience to join in the rescue effort, Gleis spent the infamous day at a Manhattan station, the voices of firefighters’ frantic families fresh in his mind.
“I saw the second plane hit, the huge explosion, and I knew it was terrorism.” He had had friends killed by suicide bombers in Israel and felt personally drawn to the issue of terrorism. A few days later, a college friend reminded him of a speech he had made at Cornell as a Near-Eastern Studies major in 1999 about the need to assassinate Osama bin Laden. After the Nairobi Embassy bombing, few Americans had even heard of bin Laden at the time, and many found the speech extreme. “This helped solidify that I wanted to go back to school,” Gleis recalled. Colleagues and friends advised him to get more work experience, but he felt it was the right time for him to pursue an advanced in international security.
In addition to working as Editor in Chief of the Fletcher Ledger—the school’s online publication, participating in the Mediterranean Club, and educating Tufts undergrads about Israel through a Hillel fellowship, in 2005 Gleis also remained socially active, spearheading a massive, school-wide letter-writing campaign to draw attention to the genocide in Sudan. Frustrated by the lack of action and dialogue about the atrocities in Darfur, he decided there simply wasn’t enough being done. “I sent some emails and some people got involved,” he recaps humbly. In reality, Gleis mobilized the entire school, enlisting graduates, undergraduates, professors, and staff to help with the effort.
“So much of the world's attention is focused on the Arab-Israeli conflict and conflicts in Europe and so little attention is paid to issues related to Africa.” A descendant of Holocaust survivors, Gleis says he was “frustrated to think that if I were alive during the 1940s--when the Holocaust was taking place—and all that was being done in academic circles in Boston (arguably the heart of academia for America) were speeches and lectures, etc., and no actual action, I would be fuming. In truth, little was being done.”
So while the region of Darfur did not directly relate to his studies on counter-terrorism, Gleis felt it was important to rally people. He modeled his Sudan crusade on the ‘pen campaigns’ carried out during the American Civil Rights movement in the 1960s, which put pressure on the government to pass the Civil Rights Act. Instead of a petition in one envelope, this campaign generated hundreds of individual letters. “With that kind of volume, it’s hard not to be noticed.” Letters were sent to members of the UN Security Council, the Sudanese Ambassador to the U.S., Secretary of State Colin Powell, and UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. “We were not making new, larger demands. We only requested that the Sudanese government follow what was required under international law.” For weeks, Gleis and his equally invested partners printed letters, stuffed and stamped envelopes, and filled all the mailboxes they could. “All people had to do was sign.”
Although Gleis’s interests span the globe and run the proverbial gamut, his passion is counter-terrorism. During the summer of 2004, he worked as the created an internship in the New York City Police Department’s Counter-Terrorism Bureau. “The NYPD felt that there wasn’t enough being done by the Federal Government [to combat terrorism], and so, in essence, they created their own FBI and CIA.” Doing intel analysis gave Gleis an authentic look at how intelligence is conducted at the local level. “Fletcher gave me the opportunity to do the internship. Without the connections and in-depth knowledge I gained at Fletcher, this never would have been possible. I credit Fletcher with opening so many doors.”
As for the future, Gleis intends to working political consulting and eventually run for political office one day. “There’s a lot to be done,” he says. If his success in mobilizing people on the Tufts campus is any indicator, we’ll surely see him on the ballot soon.
Article by Claire Topal, MALD '05
PBS: Who is Osama bin Laden (Aug. 20, 1998)
JIM LEHRER: Hours after the strikes, Afghanistan's ruler said Osama bin Laden and his followers were safe. In Sudan, state-run television carried these pictures showing fires and damage to buildings. The country's information minister said U.S. warplanes hit a pharmaceutical factory in Khartoum, not a chemical weapons plant. He called the attack "a criminal act." Damage was still being assessed and there was no word on casualties. Phil Ponce has more on the specific terrorist network that was the target of the American attacks.
PHIL PONCE: That network is believed to be headed by Osama bin Laden, an exiled Saudi multi-millionaire and Islamic extremist. bin Laden makes his base in Afghanistan under the protection of the Taliban, the ultra conservative Islamic militia that controls most of the country.
He reportedly operates from a cave equipped with state-of-the-art communication technology. His headquarters is heavily guarded by troops and rugged mountain terrain. It's considered the command center for bin Laden's network. Earlier this year bin Laden issued a call for a holy war against the United States.
U.S. intelligence believe he's already been involved in numerous attacks on American installations, including the 1996 truck bomb in the Khobar barracks in Saudi Arabia. That attack killed 19 U.S. soldiers. bin Laden has denied being involved in that particular attack.
A panel discussion
JIM LEHRER: And to Margaret Warner.
MARGARET WARNER: For more on what led to today's strikes and their likely impact, we get two views: Robin Wright is a correspondent with the Los Angeles Times and Larry Johnson served in the State Department's Office of Counter-Terrorism, and is now a security consultant. Robin, what gave the United States such high confidence, as the president put it, that Osama bin Laden's terrorist network was behind the embassy bombings?
ROBIN WRIGHT: Well, the United States has been tracing bin Laden since February. A lot of red flags went up in the intelligence community when he began forming a new group and issuing new fatuas against American interests. The pace of activities and threats escalated through the spring. And when Afghanistan indicated it was not going to clamp down on them, the United States knew that it had no real recourse. This investigation—after the East African bombings—really was unusual in that intelligence and forensic evidence, the FBI and the CIA aspects of the investigation, really came together quickly, and very early on pointed to bin Laden. Then they had someone trapped in Pakistan, a Palestinian who had come in from Nairobi flown out just before the bomb went off, and pointed the finger at bin Laden. So they had icing on the cake.
MARGARET WARNER: What would you like to add to that?
LARRY JOHNSON: bin Laden didn't really surface until 1995, and as far as becoming this financier behind this, and when he was expelled from Sudan in 1996, he had already erected an infrastructure in Sudan, and it was in that period that Sudan went on the list of state-sponsored terrorism. So we weren't just hitting bin Laden; we're going after a Sudanese network that allows it. They've been basically the Hotel Europe for terrorists, Club Med of terrorism. And the United States in hitting Sudan. It's not just Osama. Think of Osama as a white supremacist Christian. He's that version in Islam. He's full of hatred, and he's full of religion, and that's what's driving him.
MARGARET WARNER: But you're saying these also should be considered strikes against Afghanistan and Sudan.
LARRY JOHNSON: Yes. Because they are harboring these individuals. The real break in going after bin Laden this year where they're able to link all these different activities together has come from a defector in Osama's organization, and that individual brought out a treasure trove of intelligence that the intelligence community is exploiting, and that's what makes this individual target number one. It's not just a reactionary. The United States is looking for a convenient fall guy. This is not "Wag the Dog". This is going after a serious threat. This individual alone is responsible for almost every major terrorist attack against the United States in this decade.
Strikes against Sudan and Afghanistan
MARGARET WARNER: Go back then to Afghanistan and Sudan and would you agree that they are absolutely key participants, both the regimes and bin Laden's networks, within those countries, in worldwide terrorism?
ROBIN WRIGHT: Well, bin Laden is clearly the major security threat to the United States and probably to the western world. He has been harbored for five years by Sudan and by Afghanistan. These are both countries that at the moment are going through wars of their own, that have been anarchic to a certain extent in certain regions, make it very difficult to crack down on anyone. Yes. Sudan and Afghanistan are probably at the outer limits of what the United States can deal with, and it's quite clear that in terms of the new Islamic movement of the 1990s that these were the last holdouts. Virtually every place else, even in Lebanon, you see the Islamic groups participating by ballot, rather than bullet. This was the last group in the world that had money, motive, hatred of the United States. And so on a number of different fronts bin Laden fit the bill of the threat in the 1990's.
MARGARET WARNER: And why do these two particular countries harbor him?
ROBIN WRIGHT: Well, they're both militant Islamic governments.
LARRY JOHNSON: Well, they also harbor because they are not effective central governments, and the situation is very chaotic. His money—money still buys influence, even in places like Afghanistan and Sudan. And I think that brings some considerations for next steps. One of the things the United States ought to do now is put something as much as $10 million on the head of bin Laden. The other thing is you go after his money and any country that is allowing a bank for that money to pass through it should be shut down.
MARGARET WARNER: Do you think the fact that this wasn't at least officially state-sponsored terrorism in a way makes it easier to launch a strike like this? I mean, we've accused Iran, for instance, of sponsoring terrorism, but we don't launch air strikes on Iran.
LARRY JOHNSON: Well, Iran has never sponsored this kind of attack against the United States. The closest one we come to is Libya. And I think, frankly, some serious consideration needs to be given that if Libya does not turn over the individuals who blew up Pan Am 103, and—an act of war against the United States—that similar measures ought to be considered, because you cannot allow these attacks to go unanswered. And I was around in '93, when the retaliation was plotted for the attack, the attempt to assassinate President Bush, and I must say that I think the Clinton administration this time has done—they've learned a lot in the last five years, and they've done a magnificent job.
MARGARET WARNER: How compelling, Robin, do you think is the assertion that the U.S. government was pretty darned sure that this network was planning immediate additional attacks?
ROBIN WRIGHT: There was evidence that bin Laden's group was planning to attack embassies in Albania, Jordan, Uganda, and elsewhere in the very near future. The interesting thing is despite the diversity within the administration, you had unanimous approval and agreement that it was time to act and it was time to act decisively and soon.
Other embassies in danger?
MARGARET WARNER: And when we saw that the U.S. Government had pulled all kinds of embassy personnel out of several embassies worldwide, a very unusual move, is that obviously related here? Do you think those were the likely targets, some of them?
ROBIN WRIGHT: They were targets, but also in the case of Pakistan, it's adjacent to Afghanistan, this is a place that Osama bin Laden may have tried to target in retaliation. So this was a precaution as well.
LARRY JOHNSON: Well, and they also pulled them out last week, recognizing that the military strikes were likely this week based on the evidence they had. This operation wasn't planned in the last 24/48 hours. It's been underway for a while.
MARGARET WARNER: Now, speak to another assertion made by Secretary Cohen and General Shelton today that this—that bin Laden was imminently involved in this pharmaceutical plant, which was also making precursor chemicals for chemical weapons. I would think many Americans would be stunned to know that an individual can actually be in the business of developing chemical weapons. Is that happening?
LARRY JOHNSON: We saw it in Japan, Aum Shin Rykio, Shoko Asahara—he had $100 million—he set up a chemical lab, a bio lab. Fortunately he wasn't very effective in producing the agent. So some of bin Laden's money—it's not impossible and unfortunately pharmaceuticals that could be used to produce legitimate medicines also can be used to produce precursor chemicals. And in this case, when you have armed guards outside "an aspirin" factory, that's a dead giveaway that you're not dealing with vitamin C.
MARGARET WARNER: Has U.S. Intelligence known this for a while, that bin Laden was actually connected to this kind of development of chemical weapons?
ROBIN WRIGHT: I think there's been a fear for a long time, not only of bin Laden but other groups, that this was a new threshold that anti-American groups were about to cross. As Larry mentioned, it happened in Japan. It could happen again very quickly. This is the kind of thing anyone can make—a good chemist can make in a bathtub.
LARRY JOHNSON: Well, I'd take issue with that. It's not that easy, and even people with money have a tough time, but it's a threat you need to take seriously.
The impact of the U.S. Attack
MARGARET WARNER: All right. Let's talk about the likely impact. First of all, the impact obviously that the administration hopes for and the president talked about, this will interrupt, hobble bin Laden's network and terrorism in general.
LARRY JOHNSON: It may. We're likely to see some attempts at retaliation. It's going to be difficult to put together large operations, such as embassy bombings, small low-level attacks, tourists that are easy, accessible targets. I think we can see that in the coming weeks or month, but this has sent a very important message, it's put the world on notice, we're not going to tolerate or support any country which gives safe haven and protection to individuals that are committed to hatred and killing innocents.
ROBIN WRIGHT: It was a strong statement, but at the same time it was a limited military action, and the impact is likely, as a result, to be limited. After all, these are people who've absorbed tons, hundreds of tons of explosives and bombs and missiles for very sophisticated Soviet aircraft and from each other over the last 20 years. One afternoon of strikes is not going to discourage them. This is likely to be something that is going to challenge us again, and once we've crossed the threshold of responding with force, it's going to be probably—there will probably be a great deal of pressure to use it again.
MARGARET WARNER: So get back to what—how you think the message will be received. I mean, if you're bin Laden, does it make you change tactics? Does it makes you lie low, lay low, lie low?
LARRY JOHNSON: Well, it'll be both. There will be a shift in tactics. I mean, we've seen this in the past. They will look for some other way to go, but it's going to make it a more difficult operating environment. People outside Afghanistan who will have to provide support are going to be a little more leery. So there's a trade-off. But I think, given the options of doing nothing and being a punching bag, or doing something and incurring future risk, doing something is the right step, as Robin clearly said. This is not a knockout blow. This isn't the end of the fight. But at least we're now saying he's declared war on the United States, and we have to treat it as such.
MARGARET WARNER: Will it make Sudan and Afghanistan any less likely to continue to give refuge to him and harbor his activities?
ROBIN WRIGHT: Well, Sudan did expel him in 1996 under pressure from the United States and with the added incentive of the Saudi financial carrot. Afghanistan has reached a really interesting political juncture. The Taliban has consolidated control over the vast majority of the country, for the first time really effectively closing and maybe even ending 20 years of civil war. It desperately now wants recognition from the outside world. It wants the seat at the United Nations. So the U.S. does have a little bit of leverage over it. Whether it's enough to force them to abandon someone is a very separate question, but it's going to be a very interesting diplomatic minuet the next few weeks.
MARGARET WARNER: But the fact that Sudan expelled him, bin Laden, himself, according to the United States they're still allowing bin Laden to operate—
LARRY JOHNSON: Not just bin Laden—Abu Nidal, Hamas, Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad. There are a whole host of terrorist groups still there operating. That was a symbolic gesture by Sudan. They still have not responded to several U.S. resolutions that condemn them for the role in harboring the assassins and attempted assassins of President Mubarak of Egypt. Sudan is not out of the doghouse and has a long way to go to get there.
MARGARET WARNER: All right. And the impact of this strike on them in terms of their own thinking about this?
LARRY JOHNSON: It's a wake-up call. They don't have a limitless source of money, and they're going to have to make a choice now, but they're not going to be able to go out and dramatically escalate terrorist attacks. They're going to have to choose whether they want to be completely isolated or get back into the civilized group of nations.
MARGARET WARNER: All right. Thank you both very much.
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/africa/embassy_bombing/index.html
Khobar Towers bombing (1996)
Aftermath
The bombing of Khobar Towers on June 25, 1996, according to the Saudi government, was carried out by “Saudi Islamic militants, including many veterans of the Afghan War.”[7] One US official claimed that “it now seems it was not an isolated case. There is an organization of violent opponents whose members are loosely connected, organized in semi-independent cells like other violent fundamentalist movements in the Arab World.”[7]
The suspected driver of the reconnaissance vehicle fled to Canada where he was arrested by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) in the winter of 1997, and was extradited to the United States.[5]
After the bombings at Khobar Towers, the US military and intelligence community came under heavy criticism for their lack of preparation and foresight for what was considered an intelligence failure. There were "significant shortcomings in planning, intelligence, and basic security left American forces in Saudi Arabia vulnerable."[8]
Numerous warnings had been made available to the intelligence community and military command, and up to “ten incidences [were] reported suggesting that the Khobar Towers are under surveillance” from April to June, 1996.[9] These warnings came both before and after the beheadings of 4 Saudi nationals after their publicly confessed role in the November 1995 attacks in Riyadh. Clinton Administration officials admit that they “received a wave of threats against Americans and American installations in Saudi Arabia” in the weeks leading up to the attack, “but failed to prepare adequately for a bomb the size that killed 19 American military personnel."[10] Threats were also downplayed by the Saudis when Defense Minister Prince Sultan bin Abd al-Aziz al-Saud, who characterized acts carried out by Saudi Islamists in 1995 as “boyish” and that the “Kingdom is not influenced by threats”[10] As Senator Arlen Specter said, “There was no intelligence failure...there had been more than 100 intelligence reports on alerts of a general nature and very specific reports” about the threat to the Khobar Towers complex during a Senate intelligence committee meeting.[11]
The CIA was blamed for misjudging the bomb-making capabilities of Saudi militants, thinking the bomb could not exceed 200 pounds like the one used in the November 1995 bombings in Riyadh. The bomb that detonated at Khobar was about 5,000 pounds according to official US government estimates.[8] American commanders were also blamed, as they had not taken all of the precautions advised by the Pentagon, including covering the windows with plastic coating to prevent shrapnel, as "the project was deemed too costly."[8]
The main security concern at the Khobar Towers compound before the bombing was to prevent a vehicle from entering the compound itself as in the Marine barracks bombing in Beirut in 1983. The Pentagon's report from that incident, however, suggested, like the Khobar report, that the bomb, even at that size, would have still caused significant damage from as far as 300 feet away.[8] The size of the bomb, officials conclude, did not matter. It was the proximity to the bomb that produced such catastrophic results.
After the blast, an assessment crew consisting of the CIA, FBI, DSS, and US Air Force investigators was dispersed to assess the risk to other security compounds in Saudi Arabia, and to offer suggestions for the Khobar Towers complex. It was suggested that Mylar tape be used to coat the windows for a barrier, but the cost, about $4.5 million, was considered too expensive.[8] It was also suggested that the perimeter be expanded to at least 500 feet to save servicemen from flying glass.[8]
US and Coalition military operations at Khobar and Dhahran were subsequently relocated to Prince Sultan Air Base, a remote and highly secure Royal Saudi Air Force installation near Al-Kharj in central Saudi Arabia, approximately 70 miles from Riyadh. United States, United Kingdom and French military operations would continue at Prince Sultan until late 2003, when French forces withdrew and US and UK operations shifted to Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar.[12][specify]
[edit] Indictment
The three year long investigation led the FBI to conclude that Iranians were involved in the attack. At that time the Clinton administration hoped to open a dialogue with reformist president Khatami, which would be impossible after accusing Iranians of supporting terorist action. A secret letter, delivered directly to Khatami by Sultan Qaboos of Oman, stated that the United States had evidence of direct Iranian involvement in the act, and demanded that those involved be held responsible for their actions. Khatami refused to begin an investigation and Iranian officials stated that al-Qaeda was responsible for the attack.[13]
On June 21, 2001, an indictment was issued in United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia in Alexandria, Virginia charging the following people with murder, conspiracy, and other charges related to the bombing:[citation needed]
The remaining five were Sa'ed Al-Bahar,Saleh Ramadan, Ali Al-Marhoun, Mustafa Al-Mu'alem and Fadel Al-Alawe.
[edit] Attribution to Al Qaeda
Abdel Bari Atwan writes:[14]
In 2004, the 9/11 Commission noted that Osama Bin Laden was seen being congratulated on the day of the Khobar attack, and this raised the possibility that he may have helped the group, possibly by helping to obtain the explosives or the sophisticated timing device used to enable the escape of the perpetrators. According to the United States, classified evidence suggests that the government of Iran was the key sponsor of the incident, and several high ranking members of their military may have been involved.[15][16] The U.S. government may have been hesitant to more aggressively pursue the offenders within the Iranian military due to the recent rise of a more reformist government and a desire to enhance relations with Iran at the time.[citation needed] A U.S. federal court has speculated that the Khobar Towers bombing was authorized by Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran.[17]
William Perry, who was the United States Secretary of Defense at the time that this bombing happened, said in an interview in June 2007 that "he now believes al-Qaida rather than Iran was behind a 1996 truck bombing at an American military base."[18]
In addition to Secretary Perry, Saudi Prince Nayef, head of the Ministry of Interior and the lead investigating agency, has absolved Iran of involvement in the attack.[19][20][21][22]
On June 25, 2009, Gareth Porter published an article on the website Antiwar.com stating that blaming Iran for the Khobar Towers bombing was a false leak released by U.S. officials and Saudi diplomats as sourced by the Washington Post article on April 14, 1997. This gesture as reported by Mr. Porter was a face saving gesture to the Saudi Arabian government for their complicity in allowing Osama Bin Laden to target U.S. military targets by using charities based in Saudi Arabia for funding purposes as long as Bin Laden did not target the government of Saudi Arabia.[23]
Khobar bombing indictment
Terrorism charges have been brought against 13 members of the pro-Iran Saudi Hizballah
Washington, D.C.
June 20, 2001 FBI National Press Office
(202) 324-3691
Indictment (pdf)
Nearly five years after a powerful truck bomb ripped through a U.S. military housing complex in Saudi Arabia – killing 19 Americans and wounding 372 – terrorism charges have been brought against 13 members of the pro-Iran Saudi Hizballah, or "Party of God." Another, as yet unidentified, person who is linked to the Lebanese Hizballah has also been charged in the attack.
According to the indictment returned today by a Federal Grand Jury in Alexandria, Virginia, nine of the fourteen are charged with 46 separate criminal counts including: conspiracy to kill Americans and employees of the United States, to use weapons of mass destruction, and to destroy U.S. property; bombing; and murder. The five others are each charged with five conspiracy counts. The indictment alleges that the conspiracy was driven by the motive to expel Americans from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
Charged with all counts are: Ahmed Al-Mughassil, also known as Abu Omran; Ali Al-Houri; Hani Al-Sayegh; Ibrahim Al-Yacoub; Abdel Karim Al-Nasser; Mustafa Al-Qassab; Abdallah Al-Jarash; Hussein Al-Mughis; and the unidentified Lebanese, listed as "John Doe." The remaining five -- Sa'ed Al-Bahar, Saleh Ramadan, Ali Al-Marhoun, Mustafa Al-Mu'alem and Fadel Al-Alawe -- are named in the five conspriracy counts.
Attorney General John Ashcroft said: "For five years, the Department of Justice and the FBI have worked to develop the evidence necessary to bring charges in this country against those responsible for this terrible crime. Today, with the return of this indictment, we have reached an important milestone in that ongoing investigation."
FBI Director Louis J. Freeh said the indictment represents "a major step toward making sure that those responsible are brought to justice, as well as a testament to the value and necessity of international law enforcement cooperation to counter the dangers in today's world." Freeh expressed his appreciation to the government of Saudi Arabia for "invaluable assistance and a genuine commitment to solving the case, despite the inevitable challenges, sensitivities, and occasional setbacks that are inherent in complex international investigations." Freeh, who has met with and briefed victim family members and survivors since the attack, complimented them for their patience and perseverance. "These five years have been particularly trying for the survivors and for the families. I hope that this development, and our commitment to continue pursuing this investigation, strengthens their confidence in the criminal justice system and aids in the healing process," Freeh said.
At about 10:00 p.m. on June 25, 1996, a tanker truck loaded with at least 5,000 pounds of plastic explosives was driven into the parking lot in front of the Khobar Towers residential complex in Dhahran. Moments later a massive explosion sheared the face off of Building 131, an eight-story structure which housed about 100 U.S. Air Force personnel. Although rooftop sentries were immediately suspicious of the truck -- parked some 80 feet from the building -- and attempted an evacuation, few escaped. Comparable to 20,000 pounds of TNT, the bomb was estimated to be larger than the one that destroyed the federal building in Oklahoma City a year before, and more than twice as powerful as the 1983 bomb used at the Marine barracks in Beirut.
The indictment handed down by the grand jury gives a detailed chronology of events leading up to the deadly attack and provides a snapshot of the Saudi Hizballah and its relationship with then-members of the Iranian government. No Iranian is named or charged in the indictment.
According to the indictment, the Saudi Hizballah, or Hizballah Al-Hijaz, was one of a number of related Hizballah terrorist organizations operating in Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Kuwait and Bahrain, among other places. The Saudi Hizballah was a terrorist organization which promoted violence against Americans and U.S. property in Saudi Arabia. Since the group was outlawed in Saudi Arabia, its members frequently met in neighboring countries such as Lebanon, Syria or Iran.
The indictment traces the carefully organized bomb plot back to on or about 1993 when Al-Mughassil, under Saudi Hizballah leader Al-Nasser, was head of the "military wing" of the Saudi Hizballah. It is alleged that, at that time, Al-Mughassil was in charge of directing terrorist attacks against Americans and American interests in Saudi Arabia. Al-Mughassil instructed defendants Al-Qassab, Al-Yacoub and Al-Houri, later joined by Al-Sayegh, to begin surveillance of Americans in Saudi Arabia. This operation produced reports that were provided to Al-Mughassil, Al-Nasser and officials in Iran. Al-Mughassil carefully reviewed the surveillance reports, according to the indictment.
During the same time, Al-Jarash and Al-Marhoun conducted surveillance of other sites where Americans lived, worked or frequented, including the U.S. Embassy in Riyadh and a fish market nearby, according to the charges. Later, in early 1994, Al-Qassab began surveillance of locations in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia, an area which includes Khobar. Reports of this operation were provided to Al-Nasser and to Iranian officials, the indictment alleges.
In the Fall of 1994, defendants Al-Marhoun, Ramadan and Al-Mu'alem began watching American sites in Eastern Saudi Arabia at Al-Mughassil's direction, and Al-Bahar looked at other sites at the direction of an Iranian military officer, according to the indictment. It was during this time that Al-Marhoun, Ramadan and Al-Mu'alem determined Khobar Towers to be an important American military location and began an effort in the region to locate a storage site for explosives.
In 1995, an Iranian military officer directed Al-Bahar and Al-Sayegh to conduct surveillance on the Red Sea coast of Saudi Arabia for sites of possible future attacks against Americans. During this time, Al-Mughassil told Al-Marhoun during a live-fire practice drill in Lebanon that he enjoyed close ties to Iranian officials who were providing financial support to the party, according to the indictment. Al-Mughassil then gave Al-Marhoun $2,000 in U.S. currency to support continued efforts to identify American sites.
The indictment alleges that it was in or about June 1995 that Al-Marhoun, Al-Ramadan and Al-Mu'alem began regular surveillance of Khobar Towers, at the direction of Al-Mughassil. By late Fall 1995, the three learned that Al-Mughassil had decided that Hizballah would attack Khobar Towers with a tanker truck loaded with explosives. According to the indictment, the attack would serve Iran by driving the Americans from the Gulf region.
In early 1996, Al-Mughassil instructed Al-Marhoun to find places to hide explosives, and in February Ramadan drove a car loaded with explosives from Beirut, Lebanon, to the city of Qatif in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia, the indictment alleges. In March 1996, Al-Alawe attempted to drive another explosives-filled car from Lebanon to Saudi Arabia, but he was searched at the Saudi border and arrested. Follow-up Saudi investigation led to the arrests of Al-Marhoun, Al-Mu'alem and Ramadan in April 1996.
Meanwhile, according to the indictment, Al-Mughassil continued planning for the Khobar attack and sought replacements for those arrested. Joining Al-Mughis, Al-Mughassil formed a team consisting of Al-Jarash, Al-Houri, Al-Sayegh and a Lebanese Hizballah member. During this time in 1996, Al-Houri and Al-Mughis began to hide explosives around the Khobar area.
In early June 1996, according to the indictment, a tanker truck was purchased by the conspirators, who then spent two weeks converting the truck into a truck bomb. The group consisted of Al-Mughassil, Al-Houri, Al-Sayegh, Al-Qassab and John Doe, assisted by Al-Mughis and Al-Jarash. The indictment alleges that Al-Mughassil discussed a plan at this time to bomb the U.S. consulate at nearby Dhahran.
During the first half of June 1996, Al-Mughassil, Al-Houri, Al-Yacoub, Al-Sayegh, Al-Qassab and Saudi Hizballah leader Al-Nasser discussed the planned bombing. Al-Nasser confirmed that Al-Mughassil was in charge of the Khobar attack, according to the indictment.
The indictment details the attack as follows: On the evening of June 25, 1996, Al-Mughassil, Al-Houri, Al-Sayegh, al-Qassab, Al-Jarash and al-Mughis finalized plans for the attack that night. Shortly before 10 p.m, Al-Sayegh drove a Datsun, with Al-Jarash as his passenger, as a scout vehicle into the public parking lot in the front of Khobar Towers building # 131. Behind them was the getaway car, a white Chevrolet Caprice that Al-Mughis had borrowed. When the Datsun signaled that all was clear by blinking its lights, the bomb truck, driven by Al-Mughassil and with Al-Houri as a passenger, entered the lot and backed up against a fence in front of building # 131. Al-Mughassil and Al-Houri then exited the truck and entered the back seat of the Caprice for the getaway, driving away followed by the Datsun. In minutes the blast devastated the north side of the building.
Immediately following the terrorist attack, the leaders fled the Khobar area and Saudi Arabia using fake passports. Only Al-Jarash and Al-Mughis remained behind. Al-Sayegh reached Canada in August 1996 where he was arrested by Canadian authorities seven months later. In May 1997, Al-Sayegh requested to meet with American investigators and denied knowledge of the Khobar attack. He also falsely described an estrangement between the Saudi Hizballah and elements of the Iranian government. He was later removed to the United States based on a promise to cooperate. Instead, he reneged on the promise and unsuccessfully sought political asylum in the U.S. The indictment charges that the defendants first conspired to kill Americans since at least 1988, when several of the group joined the Saudi Hizballah, and later, in the Khobar attack, carried out the murders of American military personnel who were serving in their official capacity in Saudi Arabia.
Following the deadly attack, FBI Director Freeh pledged the full support of the FBI to work closely with Saudi authorities in the investigation. FBI investigators and forensic experts were on the scene in the immediate aftermath of the bombing. Freeh first traveled to Dhahran on July 2, 1996, to meet with senior Saudi officials, visit the crime scene and be briefed by Saudi and American investigators. That trip was followed by several others over the next four years, at key junctures in the case and as events dictated.
From the investigation came the establishment of a permanent FBI liaison office in Riyadh, at the invitation of the Saudi government and with the full support of then-Ambassador Wyche Fowler and the State Department. The office is the first in the Gulf region, and today serves as a critically important law enforcement and counterterrorism partner to Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states.
In addition to the Saudis, Freeh also thanked the following: Canadian authorities for their "valuable assistance at key points in the investigation"; The Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs and the U.S. Air Force for "support at every step of the way"; Former U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia Fowler, whose "unswerving commitment to seeing progress made played a critical role in today's development"; and the Department of State, whose support is "essential to achieving international investigative successes like this case, the bombings of the embassies in East Africa and many others."
Freeh noted the efforts of prosecutors in the Eastern District of Virginia: "Acting United States Attorney Kenneth Melson and Assistant U.S. Attorneys James Comey and John Davis made a tremendous contribution with their hard work and dedicated efforts in organizing this complex case. They represent the highest ideals of public service."
Melson said: "The indictment should underscore the commitment of my office and the FBI to pursuing the case until all guilty parties are punished for the horrific attack on our servicemen at Khobar Towers. We look forward to working with our Saudi partners and law enforcement around the world to apprehend the fugitives and to bring all these defendants to justice."
Finally, Freeh thanked the "dedicated men and women of the FBI who have been working on the case -- in Saudi Arabia, Washington, D.C. and elsewhere -- with dedication and a single purpose of seeing justice served."
Perry: U.S. eyed Iran attack after bombing
Perry: U.S. eyed Iran attack after bombing
Published: June 6, 2007 at 4:25 PM
WASHINGTON, June 6 (UPI) -- A former U.S. defense secretary says he now believes al-Qaida rather than Iran was behind a 1996 truck bombing at an American military base.
Former Defense Secretary William Perry said he had a contingency plan to attack Iran if the link had been proven, but evidence was not to either his nor President Bill Clinton's satisfaction.
The attack would have struck "at a number of their military facilities that would have weakened -- substantially weakened ... the Iranian navy and air force," he said in New York Tuesday during a speech to the Council on Foreign Relations.
The Khobar Towers bombing at a U.S. air base in Saudi Arabia is often referred to by the Bush administration as one of the first salvos in the war with terrorism. It killed 19 service members. The Sept. 11 commission suggested a connection between al-Qaida and the attack, the first time the group has been linked to the bombing.
"I believe that the Khobar Tower bombing was probably masterminded by Osama bin Laden," Perry said. "I can't be sure of that, but in retrospect, that's what I believe. At the time, he was not a suspect. At the time ... all of the evidence was pointing to Iran."
He said al-Qaida did not emerge as a major threat until Clinton's second term.
"We probably should have been more concerned about it at the time than we were but in the first term we did not see Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida as a major factor, or one that we were concerned with," he said.
In 2001, the U.S. Justice Department announced a 46-count indictment against 13 Saudis and one Lebanese man in the bombing. All were allegedly connected to Hezbollah, a terrorist group the United States believes is linked to Iran.
Perry said the FBI strongly believed at the time the bombing was ordered by Iran, but Saudi officials tried to discourage that theory.
"They feared what action we would take. They rightly feared it. In fact, I had a contingency plan for a strike on Iran, if it had been if it had been clearly established. But it was never clearly established, and so we never did that," Perry said.
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