Suez Crisis

The Suez Crisis, also referred to as the Tripartite Aggression,^[7][8] (Arabic: ???? ?????? - ??????? ???????? ?Azmat al-S?wais/Al-?Idw?n al-Thal?th?; French: Crise du canal de Suez; Hebrew: ???? ???? Mivtza' Kadesh "Operation Kadesh," or ????? ???? Milxemet Sinai, "Sinai War") was a war fought by Britain, France, and Israel against Egypt beginning on 29 October 1956.^[9][10]

The attack followed Egypt's decision of 26 July 1956 to nationalize the Suez Canal, after the withdrawal of an offer by Britain and the United States to fund the building of the Aswan Dam, which was partly in response to Egypt recognizing the People's Republic of China during the height of tensions between China and Taiwan.^[11]
Britain and France were also strongly opposed to Nasser's plan to annex
the Sudan. Israel feared that Egypt intended to launch an attack
against it in March or April 1957 with Soviet support.

The three allies, especially Israel, were mainly successful in
attaining their immediate military objectives, but pressure from the
United States and the USSR at the United Nations
and elsewhere forced them to withdraw. Britain and France completely
failed in their political and strategic aim of controlling the canal.
Israel fulfilled some of its objectives, attaining the freedom of
navigation through the Straits of Tiran and the pacification of the Egyptian-Israeli border through UNEF.

[edit] Background

The Suez Canal was opened in 1869, after ten years of work financed by the French and Egyptian governments.^[12] The canal was operated by the Universal Company of the Suez Maritime Canal,
an Egyptian-chartered company; the area surrounding the canal remained
sovereign Egyptian territory and the only land-bridge between Africa and
Asia.

The canal instantly became strategically important; it provided the shortest ocean link between the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean.
The canal eased commerce for trading nations and particularly helped
European colonial powers to gain and govern their colonies.

In 1875, as a result of debt and financial crisis, the Egyptian ruler
was forced to sell his shares in the canal operating company to the
British government of Benjamin Disraeli.
They were willing buyers and obtained a 44% share in the canal's
operations for less than £4 million; this maintained the majority
shareholdings of the mostly French private investors. With the 1882 invasion and occupation of Egypt, the United Kingdom took de facto control of the country as well as the canal proper, and its finances and operations. The 1888 Convention of Constantinople declared the canal a neutral zone under British protection.^[13] In ratifying it, the Ottoman Empire agreed to permit international shipping to pass freely through the canal, in time of war and peace.^[14] The Convention came into force in 1904, the same year as the Entente cordiale, between Britain and France.

Despite this convention, the strategic importance of the Suez Canal and its control were proven during the Russo-Japanese War
of 1904—1905, after Japan and Britain entered into a separate bilateral
agreement. Following the Japanese surprise attack on the Russian
Pacific Fleet based at Port Arthur the Russians sent reinforcements from their fleet in the Baltic Sea.
The British denied the Russian fleet use of the canal and forced it to
steam around the entire continent of Africa, giving the Japanese forces
time to solidify their position in the Far East.

The importance of the canal as a strategic intersection was again apparent during the First World War, when Britain and France closed the canal to non-Allied shipping.

The canal continued to be strategically important after the Second World War as a conduit for the shipment of oil. Petroleum business historian Daniel Yergin wrote of the period:

[I]n 1948, the canal abruptly lost its traditional rationale....
[British] control over the canal could no longer be preserved on grounds
that it was critical to the defence either of India or of an empire
that was being liquidated. And yet, at exactly the same moment, the
canal was gaining a new role — as the highway not of empire, but of oil.... By 1955, petroleum accounted for half of the canal's traffic, and, in turn, two thirds of Europe's oil passed through it.^[15]

In August 1956 the Royal Institute of International Affairs
published a report titled "Britain and the Suez Canal" revealing
government perception of the Suez area. It reiterates several times the
strategic necessity of the Suez Canal to Great Britain, including the
need to meet military obligations under the Manila Pact in the Far East and the Baghdad Pact
in Iraq, Iran, or Pakistan. The report also points out how the canal
was used in past wars and could be used in future wars to transport
troops from the "Dominions of Australia and New Zealand" in the event of
war in Europe. The report also cites the amount of material and oil
which passes through the canal to Great Britain, and the economic
consequences of the canal being put out of commission, concluding:

"The possibility of the Canal being closed to troopships makes the
question of the control and regime of the Canal as important to Britain
today as it ever was."^[16]

[edit] Events leading to the Suez Crisis

[edit] Post-war years

In the aftermath of the Second World War, Great Britain was reassessing its role in the region in light of the severe economic constraints and its colonial history.
The economic potential of the Middle East, with its vast oil reserves,
as well as the Suez Canal's geo-strategic importance against the
background of the Cold War, prompted Britain to consolidate and
strengthen its position there. The kingdoms of Egypt and Iraq were seen as vital to maintaining strong British influence in the region.

Britain's military strength was spread throughout the region,
including the vast military complex at Suez with a garrison of some
80,000, making it one of the largest military installations in the
world. The Suez base was considered an important part of Britain's
strategic position in the Middle East; however, increasingly it became a
source of growing tension in Anglo-Egyptian relations.^[17]
Egypt's post-war domestic politics were experiencing a radical change,
prompted in no small part by economic instability, inflation, and
unemployment. Unrest began to manifest itself in the growth of radical
political groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood
in Egypt, and an increasingly hostile attitude towards Britain and her
presence in the country. Added to this anti-British fervour was the role
Britain had played in the creation of Israel.^[17]
As a result, the actions of the Egyptian government began to mirror
those of its populace and an anti-British policy began to permeate
Egypt's relations with Britain.

In October 1951, the Egyptian government unilaterally abrogated the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, the terms of which granted Britain a lease on the Suez base for 20 more years.^[18]
Britain refused to withdraw from Suez, relying upon its treaty rights,
as well as the sheer presence of the Suez garrison. The price of such a
course of action was a steady escalation in increasingly violent
hostility towards Britain and British troops in Egypt, which the
Egyptian authorities did little to curb.

On 25 January 1952, British attempts to disarm a troublesome auxiliary police force barracks in Ismailia resulted in the deaths of 41 Egyptians.^[19] This in turn led to anti-Western riots in Cairo resulting in heavy damage to property and the deaths of several foreigners, including 11 British citizens.^[19] This proved to be a catalyst for the removal of the Egyptian monarchy. On 23 July 1952 a military coup by the 'Free Officers Movement'—led by Muhammad Neguib and future Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser—overthrew King Farouk and established an Egyptian republic.

Since the establishment of Israel in 1948, cargo shipments to and
from Israel had been intercepted, removed, or destroyed by the Egyptians
while attempting to pass through the Suez Canal.^{[citation needed]}
On 1 September 1951, the UN Security Council called upon Egypt: "... to
terminate the restrictions on the passage of international commercial
ships and goods through the Suez Canal, wherever bound, and to cease all
interference with such shipping." This interference and confiscation,
contrary to the laws of the canal (Article 1 of the 1888 Suez Canal
Convention), increased following the coup.^{[citation needed]}

[edit] Post-revolution period

Britain's desire to mend Anglo-Egyptian relations in the wake of the
coup saw her strive for rapprochement throughout 1953 and 1954. Part of
this process was the agreement, in 1953, to terminate British rule in Sudan by 1956 in return for Cairo's abandoning of its claim to suzerainty
over the Nile Valley region. In October 1954, Britain and Egypt
concluded an agreement on the phased evacuation of British troops from
the Suez base, the terms of which agreed to withdrawal of all troops
within 20 months, maintenance of the base to be continued, and for
Britain to hold the right to return for seven years.^[20]

Despite the establishment of such an agreement with the British,
Nasser's position remained tenuous. The loss of Egypt's claim to Sudan,
coupled with the continued presence of Britain at Suez for a further two
years, led to domestic unrest including an assassination attempt
against him in October 1954. The tenuous nature of Nasser's rule caused
him to believe that neither his regime, nor Egypt's independence would
be safe until Egypt had established itself as head of the Arab world.^[21] This would manifest itself in the challenging of British Middle Eastern interests throughout 1955.

Britain's close relationship with the two Hashemite kingdoms of Iraq and Jordan
were of particular concern to Nasser. In particular, Iraq's
increasingly amicable relations with Britain were a threat to Nasser's
desire to see Egypt as head of the Arab world. The creation of the Baghdad Pact
in 1955 seemed to confirm Nasser's fears that Britain was attempting to
draw the Eastern Arab World into a bloc centred upon Iraq, and
sympathetic to Britain.^[22] Nasser's response was a series of challenges to British influence in the region that would culminate in the Suez Crisis.

[edit] Frustration of British aims

Throughout 1955 and 1956 Nasser pursued a number of policies that
would frustrate British aims throughout the Middle East, and result in
increasing hostility between Britain and Egypt. Nasser "... played on
the widespread suspicion that any Western defence pact was merely veiled
colonialism and that Arab disunity and weakness—especially in the
struggle with Israel—was a consequence of British machinations."^[22] He also began to align Egypt with the kingdom of Saudi Arabia—whose rulers were hereditary enemies of the Hashemites—in an effort to frustrate British efforts to draw Syria, Jordan and Lebanon into the orbit of the Baghdad Pact. Nasser frustrated British attempts to draw Jordan into the pact by sponsoring demonstrations in Amman, leading King Hussein to dismiss the British commander of the Arab Legion Glubb Pasha in March 1956 and throwing Britain's Middle Eastern security policy into chaos.^[23]

Nasser struck a further blow against Britain by negotiating an arms deal with communist Czechoslovakia in September 1955^[24] thereby ending Egypt's reliance on Western arms. Later, other members of the Warsaw Pact also sold arms to Egypt and Syria. In practice, all sales from the Eastern Bloc were authorised by the Soviet Union, as an attempt to increase Soviet influence over the Middle East. This caused tensions in the United States because Warsaw Pact nations now had a strong presence in the region.

Increasingly Nasser came to be viewed in British circles — and in particular by Prime Minister Anthony Eden — as a dictator, akin to Benito Mussolini.^{[citation needed]} Anglo-Egyptian relations would continue on their downward spiral.

[edit] Nationalization of the Suez Canal and the road to crisis

Nasser announces the nationalization of the canal (Universal Newsreel, 30 July 1956)

Britain was eager to tame Nasser and looked towards the United States for support. However, President Eisenhower
remained unresponsive; America's closest ally in the region, Saudi
Arabia, was just as fundamentally opposed to the Hashemite-dominated
Baghdad Pact as Egypt, and the U.S. was keen to increase its own
influence in the region. The failure of the Baghdad Pact aided such a
goal by reducing Britain's dominance over the region. "Great Britain
would have preferred to overthrow Nasser; America, however uncomfortable
with the 'Czech arms deal', thought it wiser to propitiate him."^[25]

The events that brought the crisis to a head occurred in the spring
and summer of 1956. On 16 May, Nasser officially recognised the People's
Republic of China, a move that angered the U.S. and its secretary of
state, John Foster Dulles, a keen sponsor of Taiwan.^[23]
This move, coupled with the impression that the project was beyond
Egypt's economic capabilities, caused Eisenhower to withdraw all
American financial aid for the Aswan Dam project on 19 July.^[23] Nasser's response was the nationalization of the Suez Canal. On 26 July, in a speech in Alexandria, Nasser gave a riposte to Dulles. During his speech he deliberately pronounced the name of Ferdinand de Lesseps, the builder of the canal, a code-word for Egyptian forces to seize control of the canal and implement its nationalization.^[26]
He announced that the Nationalization Law had been published, that all
assets of the Suez Canal Company had been frozen, and that stockholders
would be paid the price of their shares according to the day's closing
price on the Paris Stock Exchange.^[27]

The nationalization of the Suez Canal
hit British economic and military interests in the region. Britain was
under immense domestic pressure from Conservative MPs who drew direct
comparisons between the events of 1956 and those of the Munich Agreement
in 1938. Since the US government did not support the British protests,
the British government decided in favour of military intervention
against Egypt to avoid the complete collapse of British prestige in the
region.

Direct military intervention, however, ran the risk of angering
Washington and damaging Anglo-Arab relations. As a result, the British
government concluded a secret military pact with France and Israel that
was aimed at regaining control over the Suez Canal.

[edit] Anglo-Franco-American diplomacy

On 1 August 1956, a tripartite meeting was opened at 10 Downing Street between British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd, U.S. Ambassador Robert D. Murphy and French Foreign Affairs Minister Christian Pineau.^[28]

An alliance was soon formed between Eden and Guy Mollet, French Prime Minister, with headquarters based in London. General Hugh Stockwell and Admiral Barjot were appointed as Chief of Staff.
Britain sought co-operation with the United States throughout 1956 to
deal with what it maintained was a threat of an Israeli attack against
Egypt, but to little effect. Between July and October 1956, unsuccessful
initiatives encouraged by the United States were made to reduce the
tension that would ultimately lead to war. International conferences
were organised to secure agreement on Suez Canal operations but all were
ultimately fruitless.

[edit] Protocol of Sèvres

Three months after Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal company, a secret meeting took place at Sèvres,
outside Paris. Britain and France enlisted Israeli support for an
alliance against Egypt. The parties agreed that Israel would invade the
Sinai. Britain and France would then intervene, purportedly to separate
the warring Israeli and Egyptian forces, instructing both to withdraw to
a distance of 16 kilometres
from either side of the canal. The British and French would then argue
that Egypt's control of such an important route was too tenuous, and
that it needed be placed under Anglo-French management.

[edit] Motivation of the involved states

The interests of the parties were various. Britain was anxious lest
it lose efficient access to the remains of its empire. Both the French
and the British felt that Nasser should be removed from power. The
French "held the Egyptian president responsible for assisting the
anticolonial rebellion in Algeria.^[29]
France was nervous about the growing influence that Nasser exerted on
its North African colonies and protectorates. Both Britain and France
were eager that the canal should remain open as an important conduit of
oil. Israel wanted to reopen the Straits of Tiran leading to the Gulf of Eilat
to Israeli shipping, and saw the opportunity to strengthen its southern
border and to weaken what it saw as a dangerous and hostile state. The
Israelis were also deeply troubled by Egypt’s procurement of large
amounts of Soviet weaponry that included 530 armored vehicles, of which
230 were tanks; 500 guns; 150 MiG 15 jet fighters; 50 Iluyshin-28 bombers; submarines and other naval craft. The influx of this advanced weaponry altered an already shaky balance of power.^[30]

Washington disagreed with Paris and London on whether to use force to
resolve the crisis. The United States worked hard through diplomatic
channels to resolve the crisis without resorting to conflict. "The
British and French reluctantly agreed to pursue the diplomatic avenue
but viewed it as merely an attempt to buy time, during which they
continued their military preparations."^[31] The British, Washington's closest ally, "felt abandoned by the American government."^[32]
Prior to the operation, London deliberately neglected to consult the
Americans, trusting instead that Nasser's engagement with communist
states would persuade the Americans to accept British and French actions
if they were presented as a fait accompli. This proved to be a critical
miscalculation.

[edit] Invasion

Israeli conquest of Sinai

[edit] Operation Kadesh: The Israeli operation in the Sinai Peninsula

Operation Kadesh received its name from ancient Kadesh, located in the northern Sinai and mentioned several times in the Hebrew Pentateuch. Israeli military planning for this operation in the Sinai hinged on four main military objectives; Sharm el-Sheikh, al-Arish, Abu Uwayulah, and the Gaza Strip. The Egyptian blockade of the Tiran Straits was based at Sharm el-Sheikh
and, by capturing the town, Israel would have access to the Red Sea for
the first time since 1953, which would allow it to restore the trade
benefits of secure passage to the Indian Ocean.

The Gaza Strip was chosen as another military objective because Israel wished to remove the training grounds for Fedayeen
groups, and because Israel recognised that Egypt could use the
territory as a staging ground for attacks against the advancing Israeli
troops. Israel advocated rapid advances, for which a potential Egyptian flanking attack would present even more of a risk. al-Arish and Abu Uwayulah
were important hubs for soldiers, equipment, and centres of command and
control of the Egyptian Army in the Sinai. Capturing them would deal a
deathblow to the Egyptian's strategic operation in the entire Peninsula.
The capture of these four objectives were hoped to be the means by
which the entire Egyptian Army would rout and fall back into Egypt
proper, which British and French forces would then be able to push up
against an Israeli advance, and crush in a decisive encounter.

The conflict began on 29 October 1956.^[33] Because Israel's intelligence service expected Jordan to enter the war on Egypt's side,^[34] Israeli soldiers were stationed along the Israeli-Jordanian frontier. The Israel Border Police militarised the Israel-Jordan border, including the Green Line with the West Bank, during the first few hours of the war. This resulted in the killing of 48 Arab civilians by the Israel Border Police, and is known as the Kafr Qasim massacre.
This event and the resulting trials of officers had major effects on
Israeli law relating to the ethics in war and more subtle effects on the
legal status of Arab citizens of Israel.

[edit] Early actions in Southern Sinai

Israeli para in Sinai near the Mitla Pass

The Israeli chief-of-staff, Major General Moshe Dayan, first planned to take the vital Mitla Pass. Dayan planned for the Battalion 890 of the Paratroop Brigade, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Rafael Eitan, a veteran of the Israel War of Independence and future head of the IDF, to drop at Parker's Memorial, near one of the defiles of the pass, Jebel Heitan. The rest of the brigade, under the command of Colonel Ariel Sharon would then advance to meet with the battalion, and consolidate their holdings.

On 29 October, Operation Kadesh
- the invasion of the Sinai, began when Israel air-dropped a battalion
into the Sinai Peninsula, east of the Suez Canal near the Mitla Pass. In
conjunction with the para drop, four Israeli P-51 Mustangs
using their wings and propellers, cut all overhead telephone lines in
the Sinai, severely disrupting Egyptian command and control.^[35]

[edit] Early actions along the Gulf of Aqaba, and the central front

Destroyed Egyptian tanks and vehicles litter the Sinai following heavy fighting, 1956

Meanwhile, the 9th Infantry Brigade captured Ras an-Naqb, an important staging ground for that brigade's later attack against Sharm el-Sheikh.
Instead of attacking the town by a frontal attack, they enveloped the
town, and negotiated their way through some of the natural chokepoints
into the rear of the town, and surprised the Egyptians before they could
ready themselves to defend. The Egyptians surrendered, with no Israeli
casualties sustained.

The 4th Infantry Brigade, under the command of Colonel Josef Harpaz, captured al-Qusaymah, which would be used as a jumping off point for the assault against Abu Uwayulah.

[edit] Battle of Jebel Heitan, Paratroop Brigade under attack

The portion of the Paratroopers under Sharon's command continued to
advance to meet with the 1st Brigade. En route, Sharon assaulted Themed, and was able to storm the town through the Themed Gap, and was able to capture the settlement. On the 30th, Sharon linked up with Eytan near Nakla.

Dayan had no more plans for further advances beyond the passes, but
Sharon decided to attack the Egyptian positions at Jebel Heitan. Sharon
would send his lightly armed paratroopers against dug-in Egyptians
supported by air and heavy artillery, as well as tanks. Although the
Israelis succeeded in forcing the Egyptians to retreat, the heavy
casualties sustained would surround Sharon with controversy. Most of the
deaths sustained by the Israelis in the entire operation, were
sustained at Jebel Heitan.

[edit] Air operations, first phase

From the outset, the Israeli air force flew paratroop drops, supply flights and medevac sorties. Israel's new French Dassault Mystere
jet fighters provided air cover for the transport aircraft. In the
initial phase of the conflict, the Egyptian air force flew attack
missions against advancing Israeli ground troops. The Egyptian tactic
was to use their new Russian MiG-15 jets as fighter escorts, while their older British De Havilland Vampire and Gloster Meteor
jets conducted strikes against Israeli troops and vehicles. In the air
combat the Israelis shot down no fewer than seven and as many as nine^[36] Egyptian jets, with the loss of one Israeli aircraft,^[37] but Egyptian strikes against the ground forces continued through to 1 November.^[38]
With the attack by the British and French air forces and navies,
President Nasser ordered his pilots to disengage and fly their planes to
bases in Southern Egypt. The Israeli Air Force was then free to strike
Egyptian troops at will, as the Israelis advanced into the Western
Sinai.

On the 3rd November Israeli jets attacked a British vessel, the Black Swan class sloop HMS Crane near the Gulf of Aqaba. In defending herself, Crane shot down one aircraft^[39]

[edit] Naval operations

The Ibrahim el Awal after its capture by the Israeli navy

On 30 October Egypt dispatched the Ibrahim el Awal, a ex-British Second World War era Hunt class destroyer, to Haifa with the aim of shelling that city’s coastal oil installations. On 31 October the Ibrahim el Awal reached Haifa and began bombarding the city with its four 102 mm (4 inch) guns. Soon after, Israeli warships challenged the Ibrahim el Awal
and the Egyptian warship immediately retreated. The Israeli warships
gave chase and together with the Israeli Air Force, succeeded in
damaging the vessel’s turbo generator and rudder. Left without power and
unable to steer, the Ibrahim el Awal surrendered to the Israeli navy.^[36] The Egyptian frigate was subsequently incorporated into the Israeli navy and renamed Haifa.^[40]

On the night of 31 October in the northern Red Sea, the British light cruiser HMS Newfoundland challenged then engaged the Egyptian frigate Domiat, reducing it to a burning hulk in a brief gun battle. The Egyptian ship was then sunk by the escorting destroyer HMS Diana, with 69 surviving Egyptian sailors rescued.^[41]

[edit] Anglo-French task force

A battle-damaged Sea Venom on HMS Eagle

To support the invasion, large air forces had been deployed to Cyprus and Malta by Britain and France and many aircraft carriers
were deployed. The two airbases on Cyprus were so congested that a
third field which was in dubious condition had to be brought into use
for French aircraft. Even RAF Luqa on Malta was extremely crowded with RAF Bomber Command aircraft. The British deployed the aircraft carriers HMS Eagle, Albion and Bulwark and France had the Jean Bart, Arromanches and La Fayette on station. In addition, HMS Ocean and Theseus acted as jumping-off points for Britain's helicopter-borne assault (the world's first).

On 30 October, in the morning, Britain and France sent ultimatums to Egypt and Israel. They initiated Operation Musketeer
on 31 October, with a bombing campaign. Nasser responded by sinking all
40 ships present in the canal, closing it to all shipping until early
1957. On 3 November F4U-7 Corsairs from the 14.F and 15.F Aéronavale taking off from the French carriers Arromanches and La Fayette, attacked the Cairo aerodrome.

On late 5 November, the 3rd Battalion of the British Parachute Regiment dropped at El Gamil
Airfield, clearing the area and establishing a secure base for incoming
support aircraft and reinforcements. At first light on 6 November, Commandos of Nos 42 Commando and 40 Commando Royal Marines stormed the beaches, using landing craft of World War II vintage (Landing Craft Assault and Landing Vehicle Tracked). The battlegroup standing offshore opened fire, giving covering fire for the landings and causing considerable damage to the Egyptian batteries and gun emplacements. The town of Port Said sustained great damage and was seen to be alight.

2ème RPC paratroopers patrol in Port Said. October 1956

Acting in concert with British forces, 500 heavily armed paratroopers of the French 2nd Colonial Parachute Regiment (2ème RPC), hastily redeployed from combat in Algeria, jumped over the al-Raswa bridges from Noratlas Nord 2501 transports of the Escadrille de Transport (ET) 1/61 and ET 3/61, together with some combat engineers of the Guards Independent Parachute Company. Despite the loss of two soldiers, the western bridge was swiftly secured by the paras, and F4U Corsairs of the Aéronavale 14.F and 15.F flew a series of close-air-support missions, destroying several SU-100 tank destroyers. F-84Fs
also hit two large oil storage tanks in Port Said, which went up in
flames and covered most of the city in a thick cloud of smoke for the
next several days. Egyptian resistance varied, with some positions
fighting back until destroyed, while others were abandoned with little
resistance.

In the afternoon, 522 additional French paras of the 1er REP (Régiment Étranger Parachutiste, 1st Foreign Parachute Regiment) were dropped near Port Fouad.
These were also constantly supported by the Corsairs of the French
Aéronavale, which flew very intensive operations: for example, although
the French carrier La Fayette developed catapult problems, no
less than 40 combat sorties were completed. In total, 10 French soldiers
were killed and 30 injured during the landing and the subsequent
battles.

British commandos of No. 45 Commando assaulted by helicopter, meeting stiff resistance, with shore batteries striking several helicopters, while friendly fire
from British carrier-borne aircraft caused casualties to 45 Commando
and HQ. Street fighting and house clearing, with strong opposition from
well-entrenched Egyptian sniper positions, caused further casualties.

Total British dead were 16, with 96 wounded.^[4] Total French dead was ten and the Israelis lost 189. The number of Egyptians killed was "never reliably established"^{[citation needed]}. It is estimated 650 were killed by the Anglo-French operation and between 1,000 and 3,000 were killed by Israel.^[5][42]

[edit] End of hostilities

[edit] International reaction

The operation, aimed at taking control of the Suez Canal, Gaza,
and parts of Sinai, was highly successful for the invaders from a
military point of view, but was a disaster from a political point of
view, resulting in international criticism and diplomatic pressure.
Along with the Suez crisis, the United States was also dealing with the
near-simultaneous Hungarian revolution;
as events unfolded, the U.S. decided it could not criticise outside
Soviet suppression of the Hungarian revolt and simultaneously avoid
opposing outside aggression by its two principal European allies and
Israel. Despite having no commercial or military interest in the area,
many countries were concerned with what was a growing rift between
Western allied nations.

On 30 October, the Security Council held a meeting, at the request of
the United States, when it submitted a draft resolution calling upon
Israel immediately to withdraw its armed forces behind the established
armistice lines. It was not adopted because of British and French
vetoes. A similar draft resolution sponsored by the Soviet Union was
also rejected.^[43] On 31 October, also as planned,
France and the UK launched an air attack against targets in Egypt,
which was followed shortly by a landing of their troops at the northern
end of the canal. Later that day, considering the grave situation
created by the actions against Egypt, and with lack of unanimity among
the permanent members preventing it from exercising its primary
responsibility to maintain international peace and security, the
Security Council passed Resolution 119; it decided to call an emergency special session of the General Assembly for the first time, as provided in the 1950 "Uniting for Peace" resolution, in order to make appropriate recommendations to end the fighting.^[43]

The emergency special session was convened 1 November; the same day
Nasser requested diplomatic assistance from the U.S., without requesting
the same from the Soviet Union; he was at first skeptical of the
efficacy of US diplomatic efforts at the UN, but later gave full credit
to Eisenhower's role in stopping the war.^[44]
In the early hours of 2 November, the General Assembly adopted the
United States' proposal for Resolution 997 (ES-I); it called for an
immediate ceasefire, the withdrawal of all forces behind the armistice lines,
an arms embargo, and the reopening of the Suez Canal, which was
blocked. The Secretary-General was requested to observe and report
promptly on compliance to both the Security Council and General
Assembly, for further action as deemed appropriate in accordance with
the U N Charter.^[43][45]
Over the next several days, the emergency special session consequently
adopted a series of enabling resolutions, which established the first United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), on 7 November by Resolution 1001.^[46] This proposal of the emergency force and the resulting cease-fire was made possible primarily through the efforts of, Lester B. Pearson, the Secretary of External Affairs of Canada, and Dag Hammarskjöld, the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Meanwhile on 7 November in Israel, David Ben-Gurion addressed the Knesset
in a victory speech that would set Israel on a collision course with
the UN, the US and others. He declared a great victory and that the 1949
armistice agreement with Egypt was dead and buried, and that the
armistice lines were no longer valid and could not be restored. Under no
circumstances would Israel agree to the stationing of UN forces on its
territory or in any area it occupied.^[47][48] He also made an oblique reference to his intention to annex the Sinai Peninsula.^[47] Isaac Alteras
writes that Ben-Gurion 'was carried away by the resounding victory
against Egypt' and while 'a statesman well known for his sober realism,
[he] took flight in dreams of grandeur.' The speech marked the beginning
of a four-month-long diplomatic struggle, culminating in withdrawal
from all territory, under conditions far less palatable than those
envisioned in the speech, but with conditions for sea access to Eilat and a UNEF presence on Egyptian soil.^[47]

The speech immediately drew increased international pressure on Israel to withdraw.^[48]
Later on 7 November in New York, the emergency session passed
Resolution 1002, again calling for the immediate withdrawal of Israeli
troops to behind the armistice lines, and for the immediate withdrawal
of UK and French troops from Egyptian territory.^[43] The Soviet Union
applied military pressure, threatening to intervene on the Egyptian
side, and to launch rocket attacks on Britain, France and Israel.^[47][49]
After a long Israeli cabinet meeting late on 8 November, Ben-Gurion
informed Eisenhower that Israel declared its willingness to accept
withdrawal of Israeli forces from Sinai, 'when satisfactory arrangements
are made with the international force that is about to enter the canal
zone.'^[47]

[edit] Financial pressure

The United States also put financial pressure on Great Britain to end
the invasion. Because the Bank of England had lost $50 million (US)
between 30 October and 2 November, and England's oil supply had been
damaged by the closing of the Suez Canal, the "British treasury
requested an immediate standby credit from the International Monetary
Fund (IMF)". The United States "denied the support" while Britain did
not adhere to a cease fire agreement.^[50] Eisenhower in fact ordered his Secretary of the Treasury, George M. Humphrey,
to prepare to sell part of the US Government's Sterling Bond holdings.
The US Government held these bonds in part to aid post war Britain’s
economy (during the Cold War), and as partial payment of Britain’s enormous World War II debt to the US Government, American corporations, and individuals. It was also part of the overall effort of Marshall Plan aid, in the rebuilding of the Western European economies.

Britain's then Chancellor of the Exchequer, Harold Macmillan, advised his Prime Minister, Anthony Eden,
that the United States was fully prepared to carry out this threat. He
also warned his Prime Minister that Britain's foreign exchange reserves
simply could not sustain the devaluation of the pound that would come
after the United States' actions; and that within weeks of such a move,
the country would be unable to import the food and energy supplies
needed simply to sustain the population on the islands.

Furthermore, in concert with U.S. actions Saudi Arabia started an oil embargo
against Britain and France. The U.S. refused to fill the gap until
Britain and France agreed to a rapid withdrawal. The other NATO members
refused to sell oil they received from Arab nations to Britain or
France.^[51]

[edit] Cease fire

The British government faced political and economic pressure. Sir Anthony Eden, the British Prime Minister,
announced a cease fire on 6 November, warning neither France nor Israel
beforehand. Troops were still in Port Said and on operational
manoeuvres when the order came from London. Port Said had been overrun
and the military assessment was that the Suez Canal would have been
completely taken within 24 hours.^[52]
Eisenhower initially agreed to meet with Eden and Mollet to resolve
their differences, but then cancelled the proposed meeting after
Secretary of State Dulles advised him it risked inflaming the Middle
Eastern situation further.^[53]
Eisenhower was not in favour of an immediate withdrawal of British,
French and Israeli troops until the US ambassador to the United Nations,
Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. pushed for it. Without further guarantee, the Anglo-French Task Force had to finish withdrawing by 22 December 1956, to be replaced by Danish and Colombian units of the UNEF.^[54] The Israelis refused to host any UN force on Israeli controlled territory and left the Sinai in March, 1957.

The UNEF was formed by forces from countries that were not part of the major alliances (NATO and the Warsaw Pact
— though Canadian troops participated in later years, since Canada had
spearheaded the idea of a neutral force). By 24 April 1957 the canal was
fully reopened to shipping.^[55][56]

[edit] Aftermath

The imposed end to the crisis signalled the definitive weakening of the United Kingdom and France as global powers. Middle-sized powers were no longer free to act independently. Nasser's standing in the Arab world was greatly improved, with his stance helping to promote pan-Arabism. The crisis also arguably hastened the process of decolonization,
as many of the remaining colonies of both Britain and France gained
independence over the next several years. The fight over the canal also
laid the groundwork for the Six Day War in 1967 due to the lack of a peace settlement following the 1956 war.^[57]
As a direct result of the Crisis, Eisenhower asked Congress in January
1957 for authorization to use military force if requested by any Middle
Eastern nation to check aggression and, second, to set aside $200
million to help Middle Eastern countries that desired aid from the
United States. Congress granted both requests and this policy became
known as the Eisenhower Doctrine.^[58].

[edit] Britain

The political and psychological impact of the crisis's denouement had a fundamental impact on British politics. Anthony Eden was accused of misleading parliament and resigned from office after significant pressure was leveled by President Dwight D. Eisenhower and the United States government. ^[59] His successor, Harold Macmillan, greatly accelerated decolonisation and sought to recapture the benevolence of the United States. ^[60] Increasingly, British foreign policy thinking turned away from acting as a great imperial power.

The events leading to Eden's resignation marked the last significant
attempt Britain made to impose its military will abroad without U.S.
support. Macmillan was every bit as determined as Eden had been to stop
Nasser, although he was more willing to enlist American support. Some
argue that the crisis also marked the final transfer of power to the new
superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union.^[61]

Despite the US betrayal, and although British domestic politics
suffered, the British relationship with the United States did not suffer
lasting consequences from the crisis. "The Anglo-American 'special
relationship' was revitalised immediately after the Suez Crisis." "The
two governments ... engaged in almost ritualistic reassurances that
their 'special relationship' would be restored quickly."^[62]
Eisenhower himself later stated privately that he regretted his
opposition to the combined British, French and Israeli response to the
Crisis.^[63]
After retiring from office Eisenhower came to see the Suez Crisis as
perhaps his biggest foreign policy mistake. Not only did he feel that
the United States weakened two crucial European Cold War allies, but he
created in Nasser a man capable of dominating the Arab world. In later
years a revisionist view held that the real mistake during the Crisis
was made by Eisenhower, since he showed a weakness which the Soviets
were quick to exploit.^[64]
Eisenhower was intensely worried supporting his allies might harm his
chances of winning re-election - had the invasion been launched on 7
November, his reaction might have been more muted and the whole Canal
would have been taken by the British and French troops.^[65]

[edit] France

Franco-American ties never recovered from the Suez crisis.^[66]
There were various reasons for this. "Prior to the Suez Crisis, there
had already been strains in the Franco-American relationship triggered
by what Paris considered U.S. betrayal of the French war effort in
Indochina at Dien Bien Phu in 1954.^[66] The incident demonstrated the weakness of the NATO
alliance in its lack of planning and co-operation beyond the European
stage. Mollet believed Eden should have delayed calling the Cabinet
together until 7 November, taking the whole Canal in the meantime, and
then veto with the French any UN resolution on sanctions. From the point
of view of General de Gaulle,
the Suez events demonstrated to France that it could not rely on its
allies; the British had initiated a ceasefire in the midst of the battle
without consulting the French, while the Americans had opposed Paris
politically. The damage to the ties between Paris and Washington D.C.
"culminated in President de Gaulle's 1966 decision to withdraw from the
military integration of NATO."^[67]

According to the protocol of Sèvres agreements, France secretly transmitted parts of its own atomic technology to Israel, including a detonator.^[68]

[edit] Israel

An Israeli soldier stands next to an Egyptian gun that had blocked the Tiran Straits

Israeli Chief of Staff, Moshe Dayan (at left) speaking at Sharm el Sheikh. To his left is Avraham Yoffe, commander of the 9th Brigade whose forces captured the strategic position

Israel emerged victorious from the war. Its forces executed a military campaign that leading military theorist B.H. Liddell Hart termed “brilliant.”^[69]
The Israel Defense Forces gained confidence from the campaign. The war
proved that Israel was capable of executing large scale military
maneuvers in addition to small night-time raids and counter insurgency
operations. The war also had tangible benefits for Israel. The Straits
of Tiran, closed by Egypt since 1951 was re-opened. Israeli shipping
could henceforth move freely through the Straits of Tiran to and from
Africa and Asia. The Israelis also secured the presence of U.N.
Peacekeepers in Sinai. Operation Kadesh bought Israel an eleven year
lull on its southern border with Egypt.^[70] In October 1965 Eisenhower admitted that he greatly regretted forcing Israel to withdraw from the Sinai peninsular.^[71]

[edit] Other parties

Lester B. Pearson, who would later become the Prime Minister of Canada, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize
in 1957 for his efforts in creating a mandate for a United Nations
Peacekeeping Force, and he is considered the father of the modern
concept of peacekeeping. The Suez Crisis contributed to the adoption of a new national flag for Canada
in 1965, without references to that country's past as a colony of
France and Britain. The Egyptian government had objected to Canadian
peacekeeping troops on the grounds that their flag at that time included
a British ensign. As Prime Minister, Pearson would advocate the simple
Maple Leaf that was eventually adopted.

After Suez, Cyprus, Aden and Iraq became the main bases for the British in the region while the French concentrated their forces at Bizerte and Beirut.
UNEF was placed in the Sinai (on Egyptian territory only) with the
express purpose of maintaining the cease-fire. While effective in
preventing the small-scale warfare that prevailed before 1956 and after
1967, budgetary cutbacks and changing needs had seen the force shrink to
3,378 by 1967.

[edit] See also

• Anglo-American relations
• Anglo-French relations
• Franco-American relations
• Israel-United States relations
• Protocol of Sèvres
• Israeli casualties of war
• Operation Tarnegol