Dr. Michael is an associate professor of administration of justice
and political science at the University of Virginia’s College at Wise.
He is the author of The Enemy of My Enemy: The Alarming Convergence of Militant Islam and the Extreme Right, Willis Carto and the American Far Right, and Theology of Hate: A History of the World Church of the Creator.

On May 2004, the FBI announced that it was searching for Adam Yahiye
Gadahn, a 25-year-old American, for his suspected role as an al-Qaeda
operative. A few months later, a 75-minute videotape was released in
which a masked man calling himself “Azzam the American” claimed to be a
member of al Qaeda and threatened that “the streets of America” would
“run red with blood.”¹ In an interview on the tape, he explained his motivation for joining the terrorist organization.² In
recent years, Gadahn, a modern-day Tokyo Rose of sorts, has become
somewhat of a celebrity on Internet sites such as You-Tube and has
emerged as one of the leading voices of As-Sahab, al-Qaeda’s media arm.

Amazingly, the young native of California and convert to Islam was able
to ingratiate himself into the highest echelons of al-Qaeda. A seemingly
alienated youth, he underwent a radicalization process and made his way
to Pakistan, where he was recruited and served as a translator. Over
the years, his various video pronouncements suggest a change in
al-Qaeda’s strategy. Al-Qaeda has effectively been transformed from a
centralized hierarchy to more of a communications hub that exhorts
jihadist cells and Islamist lone wolves to commit acts of terrorism and
resistance on their own initiative without central direction from the
organization.

EARLY LIFE

Adam Gadahn was born on September 1, 1978, in Oregon and raised in
California. His parents were products of the 1960s counterculture.
Settling on a 40-acre goat farm in a remote part of Riverside County,
they decided to abandon the American consumerist lifestyle in favor of
austere isolation and self-sufficiency. Their home had no running water,
and they produced their own electricity from solar panels. For years,
they did not own a telephone or have a mailing address.³ They learned how to slaughter goats according to Islamic halal strictures.⁴ Adam’s
father, born Philip Pearlman, later changed his surname to Gadahn,
which is derived from the biblical name Gideon. Presumably, the
Arabic-sounding name would be more palatable to his local Muslim
customers in the region to whom he sold meat.

Although Philip Pearlman was born a Jew, he was a non-believer. Adam’s
mother, Jenifer, was a Catholic from Pennsylvania. Together, they raised
their children as agnostics, but Phillip Gadahn later embraced
Christianity after undergoing a spiritual experience. Adam Gadahn’s
paternal grandfather, Carl Pearlman, was a prominent surgeon and
urologist. Carl’s wife, Agnes Branch, was an editor for The Christian Chronicle
newspaper. In 1948, they and their two small children arrived in Santa
Ana from the East Coast. Although he did not practice his religion,
Pearlman was very active in Jewish causes. He once sat on the Board of
Directors of the Anti-Defamation League, a prominent Jewish defense
organization. Later, he served as chairman of the United Jewish Welfare
Fund and was an avid supporter of Israel. He once won a humanitarian
award for promoting peace among religions; yet, he encouraged his
children to think freely and raised them as agnostics.⁵

Music runs deep in the family. Carl Pearlman played the violin, and
Agnes Branch was an accomplished pianist. While a student at the
University of California-Irvine, Philip Pearlman brought rock bands to
campus. For a while, he dabbled in the psychedelic rock scene, playing
guitar for a band called Beat of the Earth. The band recorded an
underground classic titled “Relatively Clean Rivers,” which was released
in 1967. After he converted to Christianity, some of his new religious
ideas were reflected in an album he recorded in 1975 titled “Relatively
Clean Rivers.”⁶ As an adolescent, Adam Gadahn also developed
an abiding interest in music. He once wrote for an online death-metal
magazine called “Xenocide.” Ironically, he is now affiliated with Osama
bin Laden, who eschews music, calling it “the flute of the devil.”⁷

Adam’s parents gave him the middle name Yahiye after the Arabic name for
John the Baptist, whom Muslims consider to be a prophet.⁸ By
all accounts, Adam was an exceptionally bright child. Described as
bookish, shy, gentle and conscientious, the young Gadahn enjoyed both
rock guitar and classical music.⁹ His parents homeschooled him and his three siblings, and they joined several Christian home-school support groups.¹⁰ A
former associate, Spinoza Ray Prozak, who operated a weekly radio show
on a student-run station at Pomona College, recalled that Gadahn was
often withdrawn and interested in things external.¹¹ In 1995,
at the age of 16, Adam Gadahn moved in with his paternal grandparents
in the Floral Park neighborhood of Santa Ana, California. He soon found a
job in a computer store and became interested in the Internet. A
seemingly alienated youth, Gadahn converted to Islam when he was 17
years old.

CONVERSION AND RADICALIZATION

In a sense, Gadahn’s conversion to Islam was emblematic of his family’s tradition of personal and spiritual exploration.¹² In
an online testimonial titled “Becoming a Muslim,” which was posted on
the University of California’s Muslim Students Association’s website in
1995, he recounted his upbringing and spiritual development.¹³ As
he explained, his father, a nonbelieving Jew, later adopted
Christianity after he picked up a Bible he found on the beach. The Bible
left a deep impression on him and influenced his subsequent
spirituality. During his homeschooling with other children, Adam was
exposed to fundamentalist Christianity, which he described as an
“eye-opening experience.”

Still, Gadahn was never really comfortable with Christianity. As he
later explained, he was taken aback that Christians prayed “to Jesus,”
unlike Muslims, who revered him as prophet, but not the literal son of
God. To Gadahn, this anthropomorphic notion of God was “absolutely
ridiculous,” and he gradually realized that he “could not be a
Christian.” Nevertheless, still intellectually curious, he listened to
the radio sermons of so-called prophecy experts on Christian radio. The
various conspiracy theories that they propounded, along with their
“rabid support of Israel” and religious Zionism, as well as their
sermons about the Islamic threat, exerted a “strange fascination” on
him. Around that same time, he became “obsessed with demonic Heavy Metal
music.” His family did not approve of that, and, in retrospect, Gadahn
conceded that their consternation was understandable.

A turning point in his life came in 1995, when he was 16 and moved in
with his grandparents in Santa Ana. While there, he had access to a
computer, which enabled him to browse the web. Eventually, he came
across folders on America Online and various Usenet newsgroups that
contained discussions on Islam and other religions. Gadahn found the
discussions on Islam to be the most intriguing.¹⁴ To him, the
Islamic principle of God as a non-anthropomorphic deity, beyond human
comprehension, was more plausible than the Christian conception of God.
Fondly recalling his early life experiences with Muslims, Gadahn
believed that they did not fit the negative stereotype of the
“bloodthirsty, barbaric terrorists that the news media and the
televangelists paint[ed] them to be.” This attitude facilitated his
subsequent conversion to Islam. In the fall of 1995, he visited the
Islamic Society in Orange, California, where he told the person in
charge of the library that he wanted to become a Muslim. He was given
reading materials and, on November 17, made his shahada, or profession of faith, thereby formally converting to Islam at a small ceremony in front of a masjid, or mosque.¹⁵

Not long after his conversion, Gadahn fell in with a small group of men
who held discussion groups in the mosque. More radical than their fellow
congregants, they had a rigidly legalistic interpretation of Islam,
which was reflected in their discussions. He became very close in
particular to Hisham Diab and Khalil Deek, two men who held extremist
views. Diab and Deek ran a charity front called Charity without Borders.
The Islamic Center was believed to have been a focal point for al-Qaeda
in the United States. For example, in December 1992, Sheikh Omar Abdel
Rahman visited the Islamic Society to lecture about jihad. Known as the
“blind sheik,” Rahman was a very important cleric in the global jihadist
movement and was affiliated with the Egyptian al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya
(the Islamic Group). A year after his visit to the Islamic Society, he
was indicted for his alleged involvement in the 1993 plot to destroy the
World Trade Center in New York.¹⁶ It later transpired that
Deek (AKA Joseph Adams), a computer programmer who resided in Anaheim,
was a suspected al-Qaeda operative and had been under investigation
since the late 1980s. Reportedly, he had connections with Abu Zubaydah
(a principal organizer of the 9/11 attacks who recruited Mohammed Atta,
the ringleader of the hijackers). It was through Deek that Gadahn most
likely made contact with al-Qaeda.¹⁷ Both Deek and Diab
belonged to a terrorist cell based in Toronto that included Ahmed
Ressam, also a member of al-Qaeda, who was involved in the so-called
Millennium plot to bomb the LAX airport and targets in Jordan.¹⁸

During this time, Gadahn adopted radical political views. Under the
influence of his extremist friends, he began growing a long beard and
wearing Saudi-style robes. Diab’s ex-wife, Sarah Olson, commented that
Gadahn’s blind obedience to his new peers stood out. Members of the
circle frequently castigated “the Jews” and claimed that they were
running America to the detriment of the country and Muslims worldwide.
They criticized those congregants who fell short of their pious beliefs.
For example, they derided the president of the mosque, Haitham “Danny”
Bundakji, as “Danny the Jew” and circulated fliers to that effect. In
one incident, Gadahn punched Bundakji because he admonished him for not
showing proper respect to the mosque’s imam. For the assault, Gadahn
was convicted and sentenced to two days in jail and 40 hours of
community service. He ignored the community service, and a warrant was
issued for his arrest; it is still active.¹⁹

In a thorough study on the radicalization of homegrown American and British terrorists, Daveed Gartenstein-Ross²⁰
and Laura Grossman identified six manifestations of this process.
First, radicals have very legalistic interpretations of Islam in which
they adopt a rules-based approach: the Quran and the sunnah
provide strict guidelines for virtually every aspect of daily life.
Second, they come to “trust only the interpretations of a select and
rigid set of religious authorities.” Third, they “perceive an inherent
schism between Islam and the West — believing that the two are at odds
and possibly even incapable of coexistence.” Fourth, they tend “to view
alternative interpretations and practices of Islam to be theologically
incorrect” and regard them as “personal affronts.” Fifth, they begin to
impose their extreme interpretation of Islam on others. Finally,
eventually, they develop a political radicalization reinforcing their
religious extremism that can culminate in jihad. The study found that a
person’s theological understanding of Islam was a strong factor in the
process. Around 20 percent of the subjects had a spiritual mentor, a
more experienced Muslim who gave specific instructions and directions
during their radicalization.²¹ These findings fit the Gadahn
case quite well. Getting deeper into the radical Islamist milieu, he
isolated himself from non-Muslim family members and effectively tried to
block out the Western world. He lived in a drab apartment in which the
only decorations were Islamic sayings of the Prophet Mohammad and a
timetable for salat (prayers). As he adopted an increasingly
legalistic view of Islam, some of his instructors guided him to a more
radical path, lecturing him on the evils of the United States and
Western society.²² He came to see Islam and the West as
irreconcilably opposed. Eventually, Gadahn made his way to Pakistan.
While there, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, one of the masterminds of the 9/11
attacks, is believed to have recruited him.²³

According to his family, Gadahn moved to Pakistan in 1998 and married an
Afghan refugee. His mother last spoke to him by phone in March 2001,
when he told her that he was working for a newspaper in Pakistan and
that his wife was expecting a child.²⁴ Not long thereafter,
Gadahn made his way to an al-Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan called
Al Faruq. At the camp, he translated U.S. military manuals into Arabic
so that they could be circulated among mujahedeen. The CIA
believes that Gadahn associated with the al-Qaeda leader Abu Zubaydah as
well as John Walker Lindh, “the American Taliban,” during his time
there.²⁵ According to the FBI, both Abu Zubaydah, who was
apprehended in 2002, and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who was apprehended in
2003, mentioned Gadahn during their interrogations. The CIA believes
that Gadahn participated in a number of “face-to-face brainstorming
sessions” with Mohammed. Gadahn gained the trust of the senior members
of al-Qaeda and began to hear talk of a major attack against America,
but he later recalled in a video that he thought it would occur in
Middle East, rather than on American soil.²⁶ Supposedly,
Mohammed asked Gadahn to participate in a plot to blow up gas stations
in Maryland, but he declined, due to his wife’s pregnancy.²⁷
Gadahn is believed to be a member of al-Qaeda’s media committee, under
whose direction the organization’s propaganda has become more
sophisticated.²⁸

THE AMERICAN SPOKESMAN

In his first videotape, released in October 2004, Gadahn appeared
wearing black sunglasses and a headdress wrapped around his face.
Identifying himself as “Azzam the American,” he announced his
relationship with al-Qaeda and warned in an angry voice that “the
streets of America shall run red with blood.” Over the years, his
English has attained a vaguely Middle Eastern accent, and his
pronouncements are often interspersed with sentences in Arabic, which he
seemingly speaks fluently. Other broadcasts soon followed. In 2005, on
the fourth anniversary of 9/11, he appeared in a video describing the
attacks as “blessed raids.” He went on to predict that there would be
future strikes in numerous cities, including Los Angeles and Melbourne,
commenting that “this time, don’t count on us demonstrating restraint or
compassion.”²⁹

Finally, on July 7, 2006, the first video was released in which Gadahn
appeared unmasked. Titled “Invitation to Islam,” Gadahn appeared sitting
next to bin Laden’s chief lieutenant, Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri.
Astoundingly, in the introduction, Zawahiri referred to Gadahn as a
“brother” and as a “perceptive person who wants to lead his people out
of darkness into the light,”³⁰ imploring the audience to
follow his example. The video was significant because al-Qaeda’s
leadership had never before given one of its members such a direct and
intimate endorsement.³¹ In the 48-minute video, Gadahn urged
various “Zionist crusader missionaries” — including Daniel Pipes, Robert
Spencer, Michael Scheuer, Steven Emerson and President George W. Bush —
to accept Islam. Further, he urged U.S. troops in Afghanistan and Iraq
to “escape from the unbelieving army” and “join the winning side.”³² While
discussing civilian casualties in Iraq, he even went so far as to
advocate the killing of Marines in his home state of California: “It’s
hard to imagine that any compassionate person could see pictures, just
pictures, of what the Crusaders did to those children and not want to go
on a shooting spree at the Marines’ housing facilities at Camp
Pendleton.”³³ Based on voice analysis, the FBI determined that Gadahn was the person on the tapes.³⁴

In May 2004, the FBI issued a BOLO (be on the lookout) for Gadahn. Two
years later, he became the first American to be charged with treason
since 1952. If convicted, he could conceivably face the death penalty.³⁵
He was indicted in the Central District of California for treason and
material support to al-Qaeda, specifically for making a series of
propaganda videos. The U.S. State Department’s Rewards for Justice
Program announced that it was offering a $1 million reward for
information leading to his arrest.³⁶ In May 2008, the FBI and the State Department launched a publicity campaign to spread the word about the reward.³⁷
In April 2009, the FBI’s assistant director for counterterrorism,
Michael Hemibach, announced that Gadahn had been added to the agency’s
Most Wanted Terrorists list, the first American to ever be designated as
such.³⁸

Becoming more emboldened, Gadahn appeared in another video, released in
May 2007, listing five “legitimate” actions that the Bush administration
had to take in order to prevent future terrorist attacks. First, he
demanded that the United States pull out all “soldiers, spies, security
advisors, trainers, attachés” from “every Muslim land from Afghanistan
to Zanzibar.” Second, he called for a cessation of support to the
“apostate regimes of the Muslim world.” Third, he demanded an end to all
aid to the “bastard state of Israel.” Fourth, he implored Bush to
“cease all interference in the religion, society, politics, and
governance of the Muslim world.” Finally, he insisted that the United
States stop all forms of interference in the education curricula and
media of the Islamic world, “especially [interference] designed to alter
or destroy the faith, minds, morals and values of our people.”³⁹ Directly addressing President Bush, he predicted that his legacy would be ignominious:

Bush, you thought you would be remembered by history as the president
who waged a series of successful crusades against the Muslims. Instead,
you will go down in history not only as the president who embroiled his
nation in a series of unwinnable and bloody conflicts in the
Islamicworld, but as the president who sent the United States off on its
death march towards its breakdown and disintegration.⁴⁰

In early January 2008, not long after it was announced that President
Bush would visit Israel to jump start the peace process, Gadahn appeared
in a 50-minute video titled “An Invitation to Reflection and
Repentance.” He exhorted the mujahedeen to meet Bush not with “flowers
and applause,” but with “bombs and traps.” His Muslim piety
notwithstanding, Gadahn is not above humor. Reminiscent of a Saturday Night Live
skit, at the end of the video he tore up his U.S. passport,
symbolically renouncing his American citizenship, after which he
remarked with a smirk, “But don’t get too excited. I don’t need it to
travel anyway.”⁴¹

Later that year, however, rumors surfaced that Gadahn might have been
killed in an air strike, when a British newspaper cited intelligence
experts on the raid.⁴² Adding credence to the rumor was the
fact that Gadahn was conspicuously silent on the seventh anniversary of
9/11. He did not produce a new video message, departing from an annual
tradition that he had begun in 2004. There was speculation over his
presence at an al-Qaeda safe house in North Waziristan that was the
target of an airstrike on January 29, 2008. He was believed to have
been en route to the village of Khushai Tari Khel to attend an important
meeting with other senior al-Qaeda leaders for the purpose of planning a
so-called “spring offensive” against U.S. and NATO forces in
Afghanistan. Customarily, al-Qaeda announces when key leaders and
operatives are killed. Not long after the strike, As Sahab, al-Qaeda’s
media arm, released a videotape in which the group’s commander in
Afghanistan, Mustafa Abu Yazid, praised Abu Laith al Libi, a leader of
both al-Qaeda and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, who was believed to
have been at the same event with Gadahn.⁴³ Al-Qaeda posted
an announcement of his death less than 48 hours after Libi was killed.
No announcement, however, was made for Gadahn.⁴⁴ Laura
Eimiller, a spokeswoman for the FBI’s Los Angeles office, commented that
officials had not received “conclusive evidence” of Gadahn’s death.
After the death rumors, some observers noted that the quality of the
media output declined. This added more grist to the rumor mill, as
Gadahn had been involved in As-Sahab’s productions from its outset in
2001.⁴⁵

These rumors were put to rest on October 4, 2008, when a new video was
released in which Gadahn appeared. Information in it suggested that the
video was of recent vintage, indicating that Gadahn had not perished in
the airstrike. In the video, titled “The Believer Isn’t Stung from the
Same Hole Twice,” Gadahn spoke about current affairs, including the
recent economic problems in the United States, the resignation of
Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, and the efforts of the Pakistani
Army to eradicate the mujahedeen.⁴⁶ Another video, titled “So
That the Gaza Holocaust Is Not Repeated” produced by as-Sahab and
released in April 2009, featured Gadahn attired in Pakistani traditional
dress. In this sophisticated documentary, he urged Muslims to support
the global jihad with “men and money.” Interestingly, in several ways,
his commentary in the video closely paralleled both far-left and
extreme-right narratives. Gadahn decried American imperialism around
the world. He claimed that U.S. corporations and financial institutions
were operated mostly by corrupt persons who dictated U.S. foreign and
domestic policies; he even invoked John Perkins’ An Economic Hitman and The Secret History of the American Empire.
Then, sounding like a representative of the extreme right, he bluntly
referred to the disgraced financier Bernie Madoff as “the Jew” and went
beyond mere criticism of Zionism to excoriate Jewish power in America
and the influence of the Israel lobby — mainly AIPAC — on U.S. Middle
East policy.

Gadahn averred that the West was on the verge of economic collapse due
to the strikes of the Islamic militants. He dismissed efforts by
President Barack Obama to improve relations with the Muslim world,
citing the new president’s assurances to Israel that Jerusalem would
remain its undivided capital and his plans to increase the number of
U.S. forces in Afghanistan. The introduction catalogued atrocities by
U.S. forces in different twentieth-century wars, including Hiroshima,
Nagasaki, Vietnam and, oddly enough, Hamburg and Dresden. Also featured
were excerpts from statements made by prominent al-Qaeda representatives
such as Bin Laden, al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda’s leader in Afghanistan,
Mustafa Abu al Yazid, and al-Qaeda ideologist Abu Yahya al Libi. The
video contained footage of operations carried out by Arab and Afghan
fighters against NATO and Afghan forces, including rocket and IED
attacks and suicide bombings.⁴⁷

The fact that a young native-born American could rise to such high
stature in the al-Qaeda hierarchy has made good material for conspiracy
theories. The sensational characteristics of his story lead some persons
to impugn his Islamist bona fides and true intentions. On the far left,
some have speculated that Gadahn was recruited by the CIA to serve as a
patsy so that the agency could hype the threat that Americans are
involved with al-Qaeda, thus justifying repressive measures in the
United States under the guise of homeland security.⁴⁸ Adding
credence to the theory is the fact that the mosque Gadahn attended, the
Islamic Society, was the same venue at which Sheikh Abdel Rahman spoke,
whom the CIA may have assisted to enter the country.⁴⁹ On the
far right, in light of his grandfather’s affiliation with the
Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith, David Duke, the former Klan
leader (and Louisiana state representative) speculated that Gadahn was a
Jewish agent placed in the inner circle of al-Qaeda’s leadership.
According to his theory, Israel, through Gadahn, inserted a plan so that
al-Qaeda would attack the United States on 9/11 to ensure that the
ensuing “war on terror” would redound to the favor of Israel.
Previously, Duke had advanced a conspiracy theory accusing the Israeli
Mossad of orchestrating the 9/11 attacks.⁵⁰

Despite these rumors, a close reading of Gadahn’s life suggests that
he is a sincere jihadist. Watching his videos over the years, one can
discern changes in his affect. Initially, his words were full of
vitriol, delivered with an angry demeanor. Later, he appeared more
soft-spoken and pious. And in his recent appearances, he comes off as a
seasoned political analyst. He appeared in an important
al-Qaeda-produced documentary film, “Knowledge Is for Acting Upon,”
which chronicled the organization from its creation during the
Soviet-Afghan War through its establishment of training camps around the
world to the September 11 attacks in New York and Washington.⁵¹
The film is regarded as a recruiting tool to motivate and attract other
Western-born Muslims. Such efforts are part and parcel of al-Qaeda’s
media strategy.

THE MEDIA CAMPAIGN

The Internet is an important aspect of al-Qaeda’s campaign, as Dr.
al-Zawahiri once opined: “We are in a battle, and more than half of this
battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media. We are in a
media battle for the hearts and minds of our umma.”⁵² To that end, al-Qaeda has a media committee led by a jihadist with the nom de guerre
“Abu Reuter.”. In essence, al-Qaeda has become the strategic
communicator for a larger global salafist movement, and over the years,
it has stepped up its media operations. As Rohan Gunaratna found, “In
the twelve-month period ending in December 2007, al-Qaeda produced a
cassette, sermon or video every three days.”⁵³ In the six
years following 9/11, Osama bin Laden appeared in more than 20 videos
and audiotapes. His chief lieutenant, Dr. al-Zawahiri, communicated more
frequently; he appeared in more than 40 productions during that period.⁵⁴

Apparently, the Iraq War was the catalyst for the general surge in the
number of jihadist online media outlets since 2003. The late Abu Musab
al-Zarqawi, who was the recognized leader of the foreign insurgents and
al-Qaeda in Iraq, mobilized computer-savvy allies to fight against the
U.S. occupation.⁵⁵ In the Iraq War, he embraced the video
camera as a weapon and encouraged militant groups to tape their
operations so they could later be broadcast for propaganda effect.⁵⁶ With
the use of camcorders and the Internet, he was able to mount
international media events at the tactical level, which had a tremendous
strategic impact. He pioneered a new method of communication and even
employed an online press secretary. The online jihadist “Irhabi 007”
was responsible for posting many of Zarqawi’s pronouncements on the web
and played a central role in his public-relations network.⁵⁷

A thorough study of the Internet revealed that more than 4,300 websites served terrorists and their supporters.⁵⁸ Moreover, there are now Islamist sites that target the Western audience.⁵⁹ By
late 2007, West Point’s Terrorism Center estimated that there were as
many as 100 English-language websites offering militant Islamic views.
What’s more, there are sites available for non-Arabic and
non-English-speaking countries, suggesting a more multilingual
propaganda approach. Thus are the jihadists able to reach new audiences
in the West and elsewhere.⁶⁰

As Walid Phares has observed, part of al-Qaeda’s strategy is to
undermine America’s ethnic and racial makeup as a way to weaken the
country’s national security.⁶¹ Bin Laden once called the United States a “gathering of nations,” rather than a real nation.⁶²
In the spring of 2007, al-Zawahiri announced in a four-minute video,
“To Black Americans,” that al-Qaeda was fighting for American blacks.
He even invoked Malcolm X:⁶³

Al-Qaeda is not merely for the benefit of Muslims. That’s why I want
blacks in America, people of color, American Indians, Hispanics, and all
the weak and oppressed in North and South America, in Africa and Asia,
and all over the world to know that when we wage jihad in Allah’s path,
we aren’t waging jihad to lift oppression from Muslims only. We are
waging jihad to lift oppression from all mankind, because Allah has
ordered us never to accept oppression, whatever it may be…. This is why I
want every oppressed one on the face of the earth to know that our
victory over America and the Crusading West — with Allah’s permission —
is a victory for them, because they shall be freed from the most
powerful tyrannical force in the history of mankind.⁶⁴

Still, terrorism researcher Brynjar Lia found that only limited efforts
have been made to recruit non-Muslims to the jihadist cause.
Nevertheless, if some converts were recruited, they could conceivably
pose a serious security risk. As Robert Spencer observed, by recruiting
non-Middle Eastern men, al-Qaeda could enter areas where security
measures would prevent Arab men from entering.⁶⁵ Some jihadist websites make reference to so-called “White Moors,” or converts to radical Islam.⁶⁶
Supposedly, al-Qaeda has already entertained this scheme. According to a
statement by then U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft in May 2004,
al-Qaeda was seeking to recruit operatives “who can portray themselves
as Europeans.”⁶⁷ In order to avoid the intense scrutiny of
travelers from certain Middle Eastern countries, it is believed that
al-Qaeda is using operatives from Chechnya, Bosnia and even Western
Europe. Furthermore, some Muslim operatives are believed to have
converted to Christianity in order to obscure their backgrounds and
allay suspicion.⁶⁸

The main advantage of the Internet for political causes is its
interactive nature. The network of computer-mediated communication is
decentralized and cannot be controlled or censored. And it permits
access to those who want it.⁶⁹ According to Brynjar Lia, the
so-called “e-jihad” depends significantly on free web hosting, anonymous
access to web storage, and file sharing.⁷⁰ Websites on which
large video files can be uploaded free and without any ID-control are
invaluable to the online jihadists, allowing them to disseminate
high-quality material. Lia identified several categories of jihadist
sites, suggesting a division and specialization of labor.⁷¹
It is now possible for terrorist movements to control the entire
communications process, determining the content and context of their
messages and the means by which they are conveyed to specific audiences.⁷² Thus,
al-Qaeda reaches several target audiences, including both supporters
and enemies. The Internet makes jihadist terrorism more global in scope,
reducing the need for physical contact and making possible the
formation of a decentralized structure of autonomous groups that share
the same ideology. Furthermore, the anonymity of the Internet allows
extremists to interact more freely with fewer constraints than in a real
world setting in which monitoring is almost ubiquitous.⁷³ Such trends make leaderless jihad possible.

LEADERLESS JIHAD

Increasingly, individuals and small groups are responsible for some of
the most lethal acts of terrorism. To be sure, well-established
organizations such as Hezbollah, Hamas, the Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Colombia (FARC) and al-Qaeda continue to mount operations; however,
individuals and much smaller cells, sometimes inspired by the ideologies
that inform the more established groups, are able to mount operations
without central direction. The likelihood of major armed conflicts
between nations has diminished; with the collapse of Soviet Communism,
the world has entered a “unipolar” era. This development has drastically
changed the security environment within which terrorists operate. In
many parts of the world, the setting is not conducive to large,
clandestine groups. Many governments are coordinating their
counterterrorism efforts with the United States, as they seek to
dismantle terrorist organizations and deny them funding and resources.
This trend accelerated after 9/11. Moreover, new surveillance
technology has enabled governments to better monitor dissident groups
and potential terrorists. Larger groups cannot operate as effectively as
they had in the past; they are more vulnerable to infiltration and
disruption. On the other hand, the emergence of new technology also has
the potential to serve as a force multiplier for terrorists. The
Internet allows like-minded activists to operate on their own initiative
without the direction of a formal organization. Hence, the emergence
of leaderless resistance as a new operational strategy and the
miniaturization of terrorist and insurgent movements around the world
today. These developments mark a major departure from previous
paradigms of warfare, although there is an ongoing debate in the field
of terrorism studies over the significance of leaderless resistance and
the degree to which al-Qaeda Central exercises direct control over its
affiliates.⁷⁴

As John Robb presaged in his book Brave New War: The Next Stage of Terrorism and the End of Globalization,
the rise of small-scale, “do-it-yourself” terrorism could become more
worrisome than the centrally planned attacks about which the United
States seems most concerned.⁷⁵ In fact, the State Department
observed a trend whereby more dispersed, localized and smaller-scale
groups are increasingly active in terrorism, often with great lethal
effect.⁷⁶ All that connects the various individuals and cells
is a common ideology, thus making them more difficult to detect and
deter. In Smart Mobs: The Next Social Revolution, Howard
Rheingold explains how ordinary people could harness new technologies to
attain political and social goals. For example, in 2001, “smart mobs”
in Manila overthrew President Joseph Ejercito Estrada in organized
demonstrations coordinated by forwarding text messages via cell phones.
Similarly, anti-globalization activists used mobile phones, websites,
laptops and hand-held computers as part of their swarming tactics that
halted the meeting of the World Trade Organization in November 1999.⁷⁷

Apparently, such tactics are now being employed by al-Qaeda and its
affiliates and sympathizers. Osama bin Laden counsels Muslims that jihad
is an “individual duty” for every Muslim capable of going to war,
declaring that “no other priority, except faith, could be considered
before [jihad].”⁷⁸ He encourages Muslims around the world to
view their regional conflicts not as isolated, parochial struggles, but
as theaters of a larger war in defense of Islam against the West and
Zionism. Since the war in Afghanistan began in October 2001, al-Qaeda
has been moving toward a more decentralized approach in which loosely
affiliated groups that have only slight connections to the central
organization commit acts of terrorism on their own volition. Such groups
tap into Bin Laden’s franchise and adopt al-Qaeda’s brand name.⁷⁹
Leaderless resistance has now caught on in the jihadist movement.
Ironically, the American extreme right has done the most theorizing on
the concept. In 1992, Louis Beam, a long-standing activist, released the
seminal essay “Leaderless Resistance” in which he argued that the
traditional hierarchical organizational structure was untenable under
current conditions.⁸⁰ This essay was disseminated through computer networks that Beam was a pioneer in exploiting during the 1980s.

Radical Islamists, often with only the most tenuous affiliations to
terrorist organizations, have demonstrated the capacity to form ad hoc
amalgamations of like-minded individuals who converge to conduct serious
acts of terrorism in what Bruce Hoffman referred to as the
“amateurization of terrorism.”⁸¹ As the embassy bombings in
Africa demonstrated, al-Qaeda has mastered a new terrorist paradigm that
researchers at the RAND Corporation have referred to as “swarming.” The
overall aim is for members of a terrorist network to converge rapidly
on a target and disperse immediately until it is time again to recombine
for a new pulse. This tactical flexibility allows al-Qaeda to
stealthily seize opportunities.⁸²

A Syrian member of al-Qaeda, Abu Musab al-Suri, has advanced an
operational strategy of decentralization to fit contemporary conditions.
His 1,600-page online tome, A Global Islamic Resistance Call,
seeks to provoke a global Islamic uprising led by autonomous cells and
individual jihadists. In it, he argues that it was folly for the
movement to fight from fixed locations; their units could be trapped
where Western forces could eventually invade and destroy them.
Furthermore, he saw the traditional hierarchical model of a terrorist
group as outdated, because if authorities could capture one member, this
could put the whole organization at risk. Taking into account these
factors, al-Suri proposed a “jihad of individual terrorism” in which
self-contained cells implement their own terrorist template to start
their own jihad. What is critical is a shared ideology that serves to
create a feeling of common cause and unity of purpose. There would be no
formal organizational links between the cells. This model fosters
adaptability and creativity in the realm of terrorism. He advises
Islamists to focus on jihad in their own countries of residence.⁸³

The power of the Internet is integral to al-Suri’s strategy of
individual terrorism, in that it serves as a mobilization tool. To make
leaderless resistance orderly, al-Suri recognized that it was necessary
to direct such actions through strategic guidance from al-Qaeda’s
leaders so that they would work with a unity of purpose. Al-Qaeda’s
leaders have taken his advice, as demonstrated by the cases in which
locally recruited cells carry out attacks under the guidance of the
parent organization, as in the Madrid and London attacks.⁸⁴

To date, Marc Sageman has written the definitive study on so-called
“leaderless jihad,” stressing the importance of social networks in
terrorism. In his initial study, Understanding Terrorist Networks,
he found that recruitment was essentially bottom-up and self-selecting,
rather than a seek-out-and-recruit process. Jihadists tended to
spontaneously self-organize through “bunches of guys” and joined groups
with which they had a contact, such as a friend or relative.⁸⁵
However, after Operation Enduring Freedom, which began in October 2001,
Sageman believes that al-Qaeda has been largely isolated in the
Waziristan region and exercises little to no operational direction over
affiliate groups that use the al-Qaeda name. According to Sageman, the
Internet is central to the evolution of contemporary terrorism. The vast
system of active communications — email, listservs and chat rooms — are
essential in forging networks. A study conducted by two psychologists,
John A. Bargh and Katelyn Y.A. McKenna, found that the intensity of
online relationships can actually rival those developed offline.⁸⁶
The egalitarian nature of the Internet allows people to have a greater
voice and communicate directly with other people scattered around the
globe. The Internet has undermined the traditional hierarchy of
terrorist organizations, thus paving the way for “leaderless jihad.”
However, a strategic drawback to this approach is that, without
direction, it is difficult for the scattered jihadists to coalesce into a
political organization capable of governing a state.⁸⁷

Sageman argues that al-Qaeda’s new modus operandi is to advertise
demands for terrorist operations on the Internet in the hope that local
networks will provide them on their own without guidance from the
central organization. In a sense, it is not unlike the marketplace
governed by an “invisible hand.” Each small organization may pursue
terrorist activities for their own local reasons, and by doing so
promote al-Qaeda’s grand strategy. Often, the local group receives
recognition from al-Qaeda only after the fact.⁸⁸

A few examples are illustrative of this tactical approach. On August 1,
2007, an al-Qaeda website promised that a big surprise would soon occur.
Although the message did not specify the precise nature of the
surprise, the accompanying visual displayed a montage of President Bush
with visiting Afghan President Hamid Karzai and Pakistani President
Pervez Musharraf against a backdrop of the White House in flames, thus
suggesting that they should be targeted. This was followed on August 5
by a video in which Adam Gadahn warned that U.S. embassies would be
attacked. Such threats have, of course, become commonplace in al-Qaeda
discourse, but, as terrorism analyst Brian Jenkins observes, highlight
the organization’s communications strategy. Gadahn’s videotape
threatened no specific action; rather, it identified targets that ought
to be attacked and left it up to jihadists to act on their own
initiative.⁸⁹ Not long thereafter, he appeared in another
video in which he seemingly commanded sleeper agents to attack nuclear
power plants inside the United States.⁹⁰ Although no such
attacks occurred, Jenkins argues that it is still possible for terrorist
groups to wreak nuclear havoc. In fact, he characterizes al-Qaeda as
the first nuclear terrorist organization. By instilling a sense of
nuclear anxiety through Bin Laden’s pronouncements on the suitability of
acquiring nuclear weapons, al-Qaeda has managed to induce nuclear
terror in the United States.⁹¹ Such threats, often conveyed through the new media, are an integral part of al-Qaeda’s grand strategy.

CONCLUSION

From the 1970s through the late 1990s, jihadists focused their efforts
primarily on targeting the “near enemy,” so-called apostate regimes in
the Middle East that they believed were inadequately Islamic. This
struggle even took precedence over the war against the United States and
Israel, or the “far enemy.”⁹² Early on in his political
career, even Dr. al-Zawahiri advocated first bringing down the regime in
Cairo. By the late 1990s, however, the security services in the Middle
East demonstrated that they could quell the various radical Islamist
movements, thus necessitating a new jihadist strategy. A faction in the
movement — with Osama bin Laden in its vanguard — determined that, by
attacking the “Zionist-Crusader alliance” and their collaborators, they
could regalvanize their movement and reverse its decline.⁹³
By striking at the head of the snake, they believed that it would be
possible to ultimately bring down the apostate regimes in the Middle
East. Walid Phares has argued that al-Qaeda employs a “world strategy,”
seeking to exploit global conflicts so that they serve its long-term
goal of reestablishing the caliphate.⁹⁴

In essence, al Qaeda is mounting a global version of fourth-generation
warfare (4GW) against the United States and its allies. As Thomas X.
Hammes explains, 4GW is an evolved form of insurgency that endeavors to
use all available networks — political, social and military — to
convince the enemy’s decision makers that their strategic goals are
unattainable or not worth the cost.⁹⁵ Based on this
reasoning, Bin Laden’s strategic approach has viability. He was greatly
influenced by his experiences in the Soviet-Afghan War of the 1980s.
He even goes so far as to take credit for the downfall of the Soviet
Union, as that war set in motion various trends and developments that
ultimately contributed to its dissolution. It is one of the foundational
beliefs of al-Qaeda that a major setback in the Middle East could usher
in a similar scenario for the United States. Al-Qaeda’s grand strategy
appears to be aimed at bleeding America to exhaustion and bankruptcy,
forcing it to withdraw from the Muslim world so that its regional allies
collapse amid a mass uprising within the Islamic world.⁹⁶

The Internet is an integral part of alQaeda’s strategy. Previously, in
the unipolar era, America was thought to have a near monopoly on “soft
power,” which Joseph Nye referred to as the ability to determine the
framework of the debate in international affairs.⁹⁷ However,
the popularity of the Internet has led to a diffusion of soft power
around the world. As of 2006, the global penetration rate of the
Internet was estimated to be 12.7 percent of the population.98
_{Extremist and terrorist groups are now exploiting the new media and
youth culture as powerful recruitment tools to communicate their views
and incite violence. In that sense, mainstream popular culture can serve
as a bridging mechanism between young people and extremist ideologies.}99
_{Increasingly, there is cross fertilization between the “old media” —
major television networks and news outlets actors and the
"new"--YouTube, MySpace and Facebook.¹⁰⁰ Media products
created by the major networks can be recycled and refashioned to fit the
designs of dissident groups. Local affiliates supplement al-Qaeda
Central and combine archival material with local content. The
democratization of the media has empowered many people who previously
woudl not have had much voice in the marketplace of ideas. Moreover,
there are now communications tools that are flexible enough to meet
people's social capabilites and allow for new ways of coordinating
collective action outside the framework of traditional institutions and
organizations.¹⁰¹ As Fareed Zakaria noted in The Post-American
World, new technology, mainly the Internet, is one factor that has
accelerated the process of globalization. What initially had a decidedly
American face has become diversified, as more and more non-state actors
and non-Western cultures involve themselves in this historical process.¹⁰² Globalization has come full circle with an American, Adam Gadahn, emerging as al-Qaeda's chief spokesman on the internet.}

_{>¹ Associated Press, “Profile of Terror? American on
List Turned to Islam, Vanished,” May 27, 2004, http://
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5074719/; “Azzam the American Threatens U.S.,” Fox
News, October 29, 2004,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,136937,00.html; and Annette Stark,
“Peace, Love, Death Metal,” Los Angeles City Beat, Issue 66, September 9, 2004, http://lacitybeat.com/article.php?id=1212&IssueNum=66.}

_{² “Al-Qaeda’s American Mujahid: Azzam the American AKA Adam
Gadahn,” Site Institute,
http://www.siteintelgroup.org/terrorismlibrary/charts_maps/charts_maps_1....}

_{³ Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Laura Grossman, Homegrown Terrorists in the U.S. and UK (FDD Press, 2009), p. 31.}

_{⁴ Amy Argetsinger, “How a Quiet Californian Turned Up on Terror List,” The Washington Post, December 5, 2004.}

_{⁵ Peggy Lowe, “Radical Conversion,” The Orange County Register, September 24, 2006.}

_{⁶ Raffi Khatchadourian, “Azzam the American: The Making of an Al-Qaeda Homegrown,” The New Yorker, January 22, 2007.}

_{⁷ Lowe, “Radical Conversion.”}

_{⁸ Khatchadourian, “Azzam the American.”}

_{⁹ Argetsinger, “How a Quiet Californian Turned Up on Terror List.”}

_{¹⁰ Khatchadourian, “Azzam the American.”}

_{¹¹ Ibid.}

_{¹² Argetsinger, “How a Quiet Californian Turned Up on Terror List.”}

_{¹³ “Al-Qaida American Was Poster Boy for USC Muslim Student
Association,” WorldNetDailly, July 14, 2006,
http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=51050.}

_{¹⁴ Khatchadourian, “Azzam the American.”}

_{¹⁵ Yahiye Adam Gadahn, “Becoming Muslim,” http://web.archive.org/web/20050207095656/
http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/newmuslims/yahiye.html, accessed May 21, 2009.}

_{>¹⁶ Rahman was born in May 1938 into a poor family in the
Nile Delta region of Egypt. Although blinded by diabetes by the age of
only ten months, he demonstrated remarkable preciosity as a youth; by
age eleven, he had memorized the entire Koran by Braille. As he grew
into an adult, he became a leading fundamentalist Muslim cleric. In May
1990, while residing in Sudan, Sheikh Rahman received a multiple-entry
visa to the United States, valid for one year, despite the fact that he
had been on a terrorist watch list for his role in the assassination of
Sadat and his involvement with the Al-Jihad movement since 1987. In
1981, Rahman gave religious sanction to the assassination of Anwar
Sadat. Amazingly, he managed to escape justice for his role in
instigating the attack. Laurie Mylroie, The War against America: Saddam Hussein and the World Trade Center Attacks (Regan Books, 2001), p. 89; Samuel Katz, Relentless Pursuit: The DSS and the Manhunt for the al-Qaeda Terrorists
(Forge, 2002), p. 53. According to some accounts, the CIA is believed
to have assisted Rahman in entering the country. Peter L. Bergen, Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden (The Free Press, 2001), p. 66.}

_{¹⁷ “Al-Qaeda’s American Mujahid: Azzam the American, AKA Adam Gadahn,” Site Institute.}

_{¹⁸ Khatchadourian, “Azzam the American.”}

_{¹⁹ Ibid.}

_{²⁰ Interestingly, Gartenstein-Ross, born an American Jew,
converted to Islam and later became involved with the Al Haramain
Islamic Foundation, a Saudi charity that was later designated by the
U.S. Treasury Department as a financial supporter of al-Qaeda. He
eventually converted to Christianity and, for a while, worked for Steven
Emerson’s Investigative Project on Terrorism (a private entity that
monitors radical Islam in the United States). He now runs his own firm,
which monitors terrorism. In a relatively short period of time, he has
written extensively on a wide variety of topics concerning militant
Islam. In September 2005, Gartenstein-Ross testified before the U.S.
Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee on the
recruiting efforts of radical Islamist groups in American prisons. For
more on him see his memoirs, Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, My Year in Radical Islam: A Memoir (Jeremy P. Tarcher/Penguin, 2007).}

_{²¹ Roughly 26 percent had a spiritual leader who sanctioned
their terrorist plot and provided the religious authority and
theological approval for their violent activity. Gartenstein-Ross and
Grossman, Homegrown Terrorists in the U.S. and UK, pp. 11-15.}

_{²² Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman, Homegrown Terrorists, pp. 31-34.}

_{²³ Bill Roggio, “Adam Gadahn Rumored Killed in North Waziristan Strike,” The Long War Journal,
February 8, 2009,
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/02/adam_gadahn_rumored.
php#ixzz0GRtnmlKB&A. For more on Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and his
role in 9/11, see Yosri Fouda and Nick Fielding, Masterminds of Terror: The Truth behind the Most Devastating Terrorist Attack the World Has Ever Seen (Arcade Publishing, 2003).}

_{²⁴ Jennifer Kabbany, “Local al-Qaida Recruit May Have Been Killed in Airstrike,” North County Times (California),
September 11, 2008,
http://www.nctimes.com/articles/2008/09/11/news/californian/riverside/
z87c167baaa4794bc882574c100760144.txt.}

_{²⁵ Steven Emerson, Jihad Incorporated: A Guide to Militant Islam in the U.S. (Prometheus Books, 2006), p. 110.}

_{²⁶ Khatchadourian, “Azzam the American.”}

_{²⁷ Ibid.}

_{²⁸ Ibid.}

_{²⁹ Brian Ross, “Tape Released: American Al Qaeda Member
Warns of Attacks,” ABC News, September 12, 2005,
http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/Investigation/story?id=1115448&page=1.}

_{³⁰ Quoted in Khatchadourian, “Azzam the American.”}

_{³¹ Khatchadourian, “Azzam the American.”}

_{³² Quoted in Emerson, Jihad Incorporated, p. 102.}

_{³³ Quoted in “Al-Qaida American Was Poster Boy for USC Muslim Student Association.”}

_{³⁴ Ibid. After he saw the tape of Gadahn in 2004, his former
colleague at the Islamic Society, Haitham Bundakji, said that he was
“100 percent certain” that it was Gadahn in the video because he
recognized his voice and gestures. He described Gadahn as
impressionable, commenting after he saw the tape of Gadahn in 2004 that
“he can be manipulated very easily to feel good about himself. He was
pushed to do what you saw on tape.” Argetsinger, “How a Quiet
Californian Turned Up on Terror List.”}

_{³⁵ Tomoya Kawakita, a Japanese-American, was charged with
treason in 1952 for his role in abusing U.S. prisoners of war during
World War II. Kabbany, “Local al-Qaida Recruit May Have Been Killed in
Airstrike.” According to legal scholars, the decision to charge Gadahn
with treason is somewhat of a gamble because the government has a mixed
record for convictions over the course of American history. Dan Eggen,
“Charge of Treason Difficult to Prove, Legal Experts Say,” The Washington Post, October 13, 2006, p. A27, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/12/AR200610....}

_{³⁶ “Most Wanted Terrorists,” http://www.fbi.gov/wanted/terrorists/gadahn_a.htm. Accessed May 24, 2009.}

_{³⁷ Kabbany, “Local al-Qaida Recruit May Have Been Killed in Airstrike.”}

_{³⁸ “Most Wanted Terrorists.”}

_{³⁹ “American Al-Qaeda Operative Adam Gadahn in Message to
President Bush,” Middle East Media Research Institute, Special Dispatch
Series, No. 1602, May 31, 2007,
http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sd&ID=SP160207.}

_{⁴⁰ Ibid.}

_{⁴¹ “Tape: American al-Qaeda Member Renounces Citizenship,”
CNN.com, January 6, 2008, http://www.cnn.
com/2008/WORLD/meast/01/06/gadahn.tape/index.html.}

_{⁴² Nick Meo, “Al-Qaeda’s American-born Propaganda Chief May Have Died in Predator Attack,” The Daily Telegraph,
September 6, 2008,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/onthefrontline/2695294/AlQaed....}

_{⁴³ Roggio, “Adam Gadahn Resurfaces in New Al-Qaeda Tape.”}

_{⁴⁴ Ibid.}

_{⁴⁵ Ibid.}

_{⁴⁶ “Video from American al-Qaida Spokesman Adam Gadahn,” The
NEFA Foundation, October 4, 2008,
http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/nefagadahn1008.pdf.}

_{⁴⁷ American Al Qaeda Operative Says Western Countries’
Economies ‘On The Brink of Failure,’” CBS News Investigates, April 13,
2009.}

_{⁴⁸ Kurt Nimmo, “Adam Gadahn: Domesticating the Fake al-Qaeda
Threat,” September 13, 2005,
http://www.prisonplanet.com/articles/september2005/130905fakethreat.htm.}

_{⁴⁹ Peter L. Bergen, Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden (The Free Press, 2001), p. 66.}

_{⁵⁰ According to Duke, the Mossad had foreknowledge of the
9/11 attack, yet deliberately withheld such information so that the
United States would respond ferociously against hostile nations and
parties opposed to Israel in the Middle East. It was a classic case of cui bono
logic. The narrative usually went something like this: The horrific
terrorist attacks of 9/11 would provoke a ferocious response by the
United States government. Moreover, this war on terror would not be
limited to al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and Afghanistan. Eventually, it would
encompass Iraq (which it did), along with other Muslim nations
including Syria and Iran. Meanwhile, Ariel Sharon could take care of
Israel’s Palestinian problem as the world’s attention was focused
elsewhere. Thus, the great beneficiary would be Israel in that its chief
geopolitical rivals in the region would be de-fanged and its restive
Palestinian population subdued. For more on his theory, see George
Michael, The Enemy of My Enemy: The Alarming Convergence of Militant Islam and the Extreme Right (University Press of Kansas, 2006), pp. 230-235.}

_{⁵¹ “Al-Qaeda’s American Mujahid: Azzam the American AKA Adam
Gadahn,” Site Institute, http://www.
siteintelgroup.org/terrorismlibrary/charts_maps/charts_maps_1160604811.pdf.}

_{>⁵² Hanna Rogan, “Abu Reuter and the E-Jihad: Virtual Battlefronts from Iraq to the Horn of Africa,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Summer/Fall 2007, p. 89.}

_{⁵³ Rohan Gunaratna, “Al-Qaedastan: The Sanctuary of the
Afghan-Pakistan Border,” The Intel File, p. 12,
http://events.fcw.com/events/2008/GLR/downloads/GLR08_T1_GUNARATNA_THE%2...
SANCTUARY%20OF%20THE%20AFGHAN-PAKISTAN%20BORDER.pdf.}

_{⁵⁴ Brian Michael Jenkins, Will Terrorists Go Nuclear? (Prometheus Books, 2008), p. 247.}

_{⁵⁵ Rogan, “Abu Reuter and the E-Jihad.”}

_{⁵⁶ Michael Moss and Souad Mekhennet, “An Internet Jihad Aims at U.S. Viewers,” The New York Times, October 15, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/15/us/15net.html.}

_{⁵⁷ It later transpired that Irhabi 001 was Younis Tsouli, a
22-year-old resident of West London of Moroccan descent. Nadya Labi,
“Jihad 2.0,” The Atlantic Monthly, July/August, pp. 102-108.}

_{⁵⁸ Gabriel Weimann, Terror on the Internet: The New Arena, the New Challenges (United States Institute of Peace, 2006), p. 15.}

_{⁵⁹ Moss and Mekhennet, “An Internet Jihad Aims at U.S. Viewers.”}

_{>⁶⁰ Brynjar Lia, “Jihadi Web Media Production:
Characteristics, Trends, and Future Implications,” February 2007,
http://www.mil.no/multimedia/archive/00092/Jihadi_Web_Media_Pro_92100a.p....}

_{⁶¹ Walid Phares, Future Jihad: Terrorist Strategies against America (Palgrave/Macmillan, 2005), p. 169.}

_{⁶² Phares, Future Jihad, p. 119.}

_{⁶³ Moss and Mekhennet, “An Internet Jihad Aims at U.S. Viewers.”}

_{⁶⁴ “Al-Qaeda No. 2 Mocks American ‘Failure,’” USATODAY,
May 5, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/news/
world/iraq/2007-05-05-alqaeda-video_N.htm; and Raymond Ibrahim, “Seeking
Sympathy from the Infidel: Zawahiri Invokes the Language of Social
Justice,” National Review Online, May 21, 2007, http://article. nationalreview.com/?q=MzJmOWYwYWQ5MjFjMWU0NmE1YmRmNzUwZmFkMjM0ZTk=.}

_{⁶⁵ Robert Spencer, “The New Face of Al-Qaeda,” Frontpagemag.com, June 2, 2004, http://www.frontpagemagazine.com/readArticle.aspx?ARTID=12821.}

_{⁶⁶ Brynjar Lia, “Al-Qaeda Online: Understanding Jihadist Internet Infrastructure, Jane’s Intelligence Review, January 1, 2006, http://www.mil.no/multimedia/archive/00075/Al-Qaeda_online__und_75416a.p....}

_{⁶⁷ Quoted in “U.S. Says al-Qaeda Ready to Hit ‘Hard,’” iafrica.com, May 27, 2004, http://iafrica.com/news/worldnews/325459.htm.}

_{⁶⁸ John Diamond and Toni Lacy, “Non-Arab Recruits Scout for al-Qaeda,” USA Today, August, 16, 2004.}

_{⁶⁹ Weimann, Terror on the Internet, pp. 24-25.}

_{⁷⁰ Lia, “Al-Qaeda online.”}

_{>⁷¹ These include, first, the key nodes, or mother sites,
that are the official home pages of jihadist groups. Second, there are
distributors, a host of various websites that copy and upload material
on multiple sites and direct the viewers to the most important sites.
Finally, the producers reformat and refashion the raw material from the
key nodes into a sleeker and more attractive product. Lia found that the
sites have evolved from non-interactive, more official websites that
are established by the jihadist groups toward a more multi-layered and
redundant media production and distribution system. Lia, “Al-Qaeda
Online.”}

_{⁷² Bruce Hoffmann, “Introduction,” in Weimann, Terror on the Internet, p. ix.}

_{⁷³ Lia, “Al-Qaeda Online.”}

_{⁷⁴ See Bruce Hoffman, “The Myth of Grass-Roots Terrorism: Why Osama bin Laden Still Matters,” Foreign Affairs, (May/June 2008); and Elaine Sciolino and Eric Schmitt, “A Not Very Private Feud over Terrorism,” The New York Times, June 8, 2008.}

_{⁷⁵ John Robb, Brave New War: The Next Stage of Terrorism and the End of Globalization (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2007).}

_{>⁷⁶ U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on
Terrorism 2005 (Government Printing Office, 2005), chap. 2;
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/65465.pdf.}

_{⁷⁷ Howard Rheingold, Smart Mobs: The Next Social Revolution (Basic Books, 2002), pp. 157-162.}

_{⁷⁸ Fawaz A. Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global (Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 3.}

_{⁷⁹ Adam Elkus, “Future War: The War on Terror after Iraq,” Athena Intelligence Journal, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2007, p. 20.}

_{⁸⁰ According to Beam, the government is too powerful and will
not allow the existence of any potentially serious oppositional
organizations. The leaderless-resistance model proffered by Beam
rejects the pyramid structure in which the leadership is located at the
top and the mass of followers at the bottom. Beam reasons that in a
technologically advanced society such as contemporary America, the
government through means such as electronic surveillance can without too
much difficulty penetrate the structure and reveal its chain of
command. From there, the organization can be effectively neutralized
from within by infiltrators and agents provocateur. As a strategic
alternative, Beam invokes the “phantom cell” model of organization.
Applying this model, Beam argues that it becomes the responsibility of
the individual to acquire the necessary skills and information to carry
out what is to be done. Individuals take action when and where they see
fit. Organs of information, such as newspapers, leaflets and now the
Internet, enable each person to keep informed of events. Beam concedes
that leaderless resistance is a “child of necessity,” but argues that
all other alternatives are either unworkable or impractical.
Furthermore, he points out that this approach presents an intelligence
nightmare for authorities insofar as it is much more difficult to
infiltrate “a thousand different small phantom cells opposing them.” See
Louis Beam, “Leaderless Resistance.” The Seditionist, Issue 12, February 1992; and Louis Beam, “Understanding the Struggle or Why We have to Kill the Bastards,” in Essays of a Klansman (A.K.I.A. Publications, 1983), pp. 45-51, and “Understanding the Struggle Part II,” in Beam, Essays of a Klansman, pp. 52-72. For more on the extreme right’s theorizing on the leaderless resistance concept, see George Michael, Confronting Right-Wing Extremism and Terrorism in the USA (Routledge, 2003), pp. 113-123.}

_{⁸¹ Bruce Hoffman, “Responding to Terrorism across the Technological Spectrum,” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 6, No. 3, Autumn 1994, pp. 365-389.}

_{>⁸² John Arqulla and David Ronfeldt, “Afterword
(September 2001): The Sharpening Fight for the Future,” in John Arquilla
and David Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime and Militancy (RAND, 2001), p. 367.
⁸³ Paul Cruickshank and Mohammad Hage Ali, “Abu Musab al Suri: Architect of the New Al Qaeda,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 30, No. 1 (2007), pp. 1-14.}

_{⁸⁴ Brynjar Lia, Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of Al-Qaida Strategist Abu Musad al-Suri (Columbia University Press, 2008).}

_{⁸⁵ Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004).}

_{⁸⁶ John A. Bargh and Katelyn Y.A. McKenna, “The Internet and Social Life,” Annual Review of Psychology, Vol. 55, 2004, pp. 573-590.}

_{⁸⁷ Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century (University Of Pennsylvania Press, 2008).}

_{⁸⁸ Sageman, Leaderless Jihad.}

_{⁸⁹ Jenkins, Will Terrorists Go Nuclear? pp. 127-29.}

_{⁹⁰ “Al-Qaida American Was Poster Boy for USC Muslim Student Association.”}

_{⁹¹ Jenkins, Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?}

_{⁹² A chief ideologist in this regard was the Egyptian Muhammad Faraj, whose tract, The Neglected Duty,
argued that any means necessary were justified in order to overthrow
apostate regimes. Faraj was affiliated with Jama’at al-Jihad and played
an important role in the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar
Sadat. For more on Faraj, see Walter Laqueur, No End to War: Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century (Continuum, 2003), p. 37; and Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, pp. 17-18.}

_{⁹³ Gerges, The Far Enemy.}

_{⁹⁴ See Walid Phares, Future Jihad; and The Confrontation: Winning the War against Future Jihad (Palgrave/ Macmillan, 2008).}

_{⁹⁵ Thomas X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21^st Century (Zenith Press, 2004).}

_{⁹⁶ The noted authority on counterinsurgency, David
Kilcullelln, used the metaphor of an infection to explain the process of
how al-Qaeda is able to take advantage of hot spots in the Islamic
world and establish a local presence from which to attack U.S. and
Western interests. In the infection state, al-Qaeda inserts itself into
remote areas and creates alliances with local communities. Once
ensconced, a contagion phase begins in which the group’s influence
spreads. By exporting violence, al-Qaeda prompts a Western response,
thus leading to the third stage, intervention. The organization then
exploits this backlash against the intervention to generate support for
its Islamist agenda, which finally results in the emergence of local
insurgents or “accidental guerillas,” who fight to evict the foreign
occupiers, not so much out of some radical Islamist ideology, but,
rather, a more elemental desire to resist a foreign body akin to
antibodies fighting an infection. David Kilcullelln, The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (Oxford University Press, 2009).}

_{⁹⁷ Such intangibles, including media, culture and ideology,
are in contrast to tangible resources such as military and economic
might. Joseph Nye, “The Changing Nature of World Power,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 105, Issue 2, Summer, 1990, p. 7.}

_{⁹⁸ Weimann, Terror on the Internet, p. 19.}

_{>⁹⁹ Kara-Jane Lombard, “Gen E (Generation Extremist): The
Significance of Youth Culture and New Media n Youth Extremism,” in
Priyan Mendis, Joseph Lai, Ed Dawson, and Hussein Abass, Recent Advances in Security Technology
(Melbourne: The Research Network for a Secure Australia, 2007),
http://www.cs.adfa.edu.au/~s3165516/Papers/Cornforth_IntelligentEvacuati....}

_{¹⁰⁰ Henry Jenkins, Convergence Culture: Where Old and New Media Collide (New York University Press, 2006).}

_{¹⁰¹ Clay Shirky, Here Comes Everybody: The Power of Organizing without Organizations (Penguin Press, 2008), pp. 20-21.}

_{¹⁰² Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World (W.W. Norton, 2008).}